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Introduction
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) is an investment approach that combines investors’ fi-
nancial objectives with their concerns about environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues
(Eurosif, 2016). Investors and asset managers achieve this goal by implementing SRI strategies.
These involve avoiding companies engaged in activities considered harmful to society, select-
ing the best performing ones in terms of ESG criteria or collaborating with them in order to
influence their behaviour and improve their ESG performance.
The origins of the phenomenon can be traced back to the eighteenth century, but it is in the
last two decades that, especially in Europe and theUnited States, these SRI practices experienced
an outstanding growth in terms of adoption rates. This expansion can be attributed to a strong
demand from institutional investors, the launch of numerous international initiatives, legislations
and an increasing attention from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While SRI mainly
developed as an equity focused investment style, its principles are now applied to a variety of
asset classes like bonds, commodities and real estate.
One of the main obstacles that, especially in less recent years, has kept investors from adopt-
ing a socially responsible investment approach has been the belief that social and financial per-
formances are negatively correlated. Companies with good Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) records where thought to face competitive disadvantages, resulting in lower profits and
lower returns for investors. Additionally, what most of the SRI strategies have in common is the
exclusion of those assets that does not comply with the ethical and moral standards pursued by
investors. As well known from Modern Portfolio Theory (Markowitz, 1952), by reducing the
number of assets from their investment pool (or universe), investors give up on diversification
opportunities, resulting in losses in terms of mean-variance efficiency.
The existing literature is abundant in studies aimed at verifying whether socially responsible
investors are forced to pay a price in terms of financial performance in order to pursue their so-
cial goals. Most of them focused only on the first aspect of the problem; verifying whether the
stocks of socially responsible companies underperform those of conventional ones. Findings,
overall, were consistent with the so-called “no effect” hypothesis (Statman & Glushkov, 2009),
1
2 INTRODUCTION
according to which the social aspects does not significantly influence stock performances. Only
few studies, instead, based on mean-variance analysis, verified the effects of the exclusion of
non socially responsible assets from the investment universe. Most notably, those by Galema,
Scholtens, and Plantinga (2009) and Herzel, Nicolosi, and Stărică (2012) employed spanning
tests (Huberman & Kandel, 1987) and data relative to the North American equity market to
verify whether the efficient frontier available to socially responsible investors significantly dif-
fers from that available to traditional investors. Their results showed that, when not imposing
additional constraints, the hypothesis of spanning was almost always rejected, mostly because
of losses in terms of risk reduction opportunities. These differences were no more significant
when introducing restrictions to short-selling (positivity constraints), a condition faced by many
investors.
Inspired by the aforementioned research, the main goal of this master thesis was to test the
ex-ante mean-variance efficiency of equity portfolios to which SRI exclusions were applied. In
particular, efficiency was tested on a rolling basis and adopting the methodology from Jobson
(1982) and Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989). The rolling approach, opposed to the one used
in similar studies, which involved testing only a single time frame, allowed verifying whether
the effects of the exclusions are constant through time or depend on market conditions. Also,
instead of focusing on the North American equity market, like most of the existing SRI research,
the data usedwas relative to the European region, more specifically, to the constituent companies
of the STOXX Europe 600 index. The implementation of the SRI strategies, a combination of
negative and positive screening, was possible thanks to Asset4’s ESG data, retrieved, as for
almost all empirical data used in this research, from Thompson Reuter’s Datastream.
A significant part of this research was also aimed at testing the difference in realized per-
formance, both in terms of Sharpe ratio and variance, of screened and non screened portfolios,
obtained simulating different types of dynamic allocation strategies. The process involved per-
forming the tests proposed by Ledoit and Wolf (2008, 2011).
Lastly, as in Herzel et al. (2012), the impact of excluding companies based on the three
dimensions of sustainability—environment, social and governance—were singularly tested, re-
peating, for each one, the above mentioned methodologies.
Document Structure
The first chapter consists in an overview of the SRI phenomenon. After a first section reserved
for the definitions, the chapter proceeds with the history of the phenomenon, from its roots,
through the evolution phases, up to its current state, defining the demand drivers and listing
3the major players involved (asset owners, rating agencies, indices providers and NGOs). The
chapter ends by describing the main strategies employed by socially responsible investors.
Chapter 2 contains a review of the existing literature. The publications here reviewed are
all aimed at studying the difference in performance between SRI and conventional forms of
investments. This chapter also contains two sections to introduce the main hypotheses and the
methodologies most commonly employed to verify them.
Chapter 3 contains themethodology used in this research. It starts by briefly presentingMod-
ern Portfolio Theory and the notions of efficient frontier and optimal portfolios. It then continues
describing the test procedures employed for the empirical research, in particular: mean-variance
efficiency test (with and without short-selling restrictions), Sharpe ratio and variance tests.
The fourth chapter thoroughly describes every single step of the empirical research. These
include data retrieval and processing, the implementation of the SRI strategies, a descriptive
analysis and the testing procedure. Results are then displayed and discussed with the aid of
plots and tables.
The last chapter is reserved for the conclusions and recommendations for future research.
4 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1
Socially Responsible Investment
1.1 Definitions
According to Louche and Lydenberg (2010), Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) can be
defined both as a product and a practice. It is a product in the sense that investors acquire, hold
and sell stocks of companies that perform well in terms of environment, social and governance
(ESG) factors as well as ethical factors. At the same time it is a practice through which investors
select companies with good Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) records and engage with the
same companies in order to influence their behaviour and help improve their ESG performance.
The heterogeneity that characterises SRI has lead to the usage of many different terms to
describe it; ethical investing, sustainable investing, green investing, ESG investing, impact in-
vesting, are just a few of them. Although some authors proposed to make a distinction between
the many natures of SRI and to identify what can be considered as such (Sparkes, 2001), what
most academics and practitioners seems to agree with is that the essence of SRI is, as stated by
Sandberg et al. (2009), the “integration of certain non-financial concerns, such as ethical, so-
cial or environmental, into the investment process” (p. 521) and the pursuit of long-term value
creation (Louche & Lydenberg, 2010).
Finding a valid definition for Socially Responsible Investment was not one of the main goals
of this study. Instead, it was crucial to take an impartial stance on the phenomenon, free of any
personal considerations and relying, instead, on the work of accredited authors and organisa-
tions. This chapter serves this purpose by describing the evolution of the SRI phenomenon,
from its first manifestations up to current years.
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1.2 Origins and Evolution
The origins of the SRI phenomenon can be traced back to the eighteenth century when religious
institutions, such as the Society of Friend (Quakers) and the Methodists, were the first to apply
social screening to their investments, trying to reconcile the values they preached with the reality
of the business activity (Kinder & Domini, 1997; Louche, Arenas, & van Cranenburgh, 2012).
One of the founders of the Methodist Church, John Wesley, in one of his sermons, “The use of
Money”, going as far as identifying specific products and businesses to avoid, admonished his
people to abstain from making money and profiting by hurting others (Domini, 2001). Major
players in the North American financial community of the first half of the 20th century, although
not directly related to religious groups, followed policies of not investing in stocks of alcohol,
tobacco and gambling companies (so-called “sin stocks”) basing these decisions on their ethical
andmoral principles (Louche&Lydenberg, 2006). This is the case of Pioneer Investments, who,
in 1928, launched what is considered to be the first SRI mutual fund. Louche and Lydenberg
(2010) identified this period as the Roots phase of the SRI phenomenon.
From the 1970s up to late 1980s, in what can be defined as the Development phase, mostly
in the United States, SRI started to evolve from an exclusive religious and faith based activity to
become amore widespread process of promotion of corporations’ social responsibility (Sparkes,
2001). Up until then, religious affiliations practised responsible investing by simply avoiding
questionable companies, while the modern forms of SRI, emerged in the United States and
Europe in those years, began to place increasing importance on the influence that investors,
through shareholder activism, could have on the behaviour of corporations with regards of social
and environmental issues (Louche & Lydenberg, 2006). These were also years characterized by
political and protest movements (anti-Vietnam War in the United States and anti-apartheid in
South Africa) that inevitably started to become a major drive in responsible investing (Louche
& Lydenberg, 2006). The Pax fund, one of the first U.S. retail SRI mutual fund, launched in
1971 inspired by investors’ fears of profiting from the Vietnam War (Sparkes, 2001).
Europe too, in this period, experienced the birth of the first SRI mutual funds. In 1965
the Church of Sweden established the Ansvar Aktiefond Sverige, the first European ethic fund
(Louche et al., 2012). While, in 1984, in the UK, Friends Provident, a Quaker-affiliated insur-
ance company, launched the Stewardship Unit trust (Louche & Lydenberg, 2006).
The 1990s where characterised by the Transition phase. Environmental concerns began to
increase in importance (see The Kyoto Protocol, 1997) and, especially in Europe, numerous
green funds emerged stressing the importance of identifying positive sectors and activities re-
lated to the environment (renewable energy, clean technologies, etc.). In this period, the number
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of agencies providing ESG ratings and the number of SRI indices experienced a rapid growth
(Louche & Lydenberg, 2010).
A constantly growing interest by institutional investors is what mainly determined the expan-
sion phase, during the first decade of the twentieth century. As SRI was losing part of its activist
and religious connotations, new investment strategies, such as a Best-in-Class approach, started
to be employed. The increasing accessibility and quality of companies’ CSR reports, combined
with different legislations and regulations put in place, especially in Europe, requiring pension
funds to disclose their degree of ESG integration in their investment decisions, helped SRI to
find acceptance in the mainstream financial community, becoming one of the fastest growing
areas in finance (Sandberg et al., 2009).
Louche and Lydenberg (2010) identified the launch, in 2006, of the Principles for Respon-
sible Investment (PRI) initiative as the event that marked the beginning of the Mainstreaming
phase.
1.3 Current State
In recent years, the SRI phenomenon experienced a phase of outstanding growth. According
to the Global Sustainable Investment Review from GSIA1(2014), the Responsible Investment
market grew from the 13.3 trillion dollars of the beginning of 2012 to the 21.4 trillions in the
first months of 2014, reaching 30.2% of the professionally managed assets.
In those two years the country that experienced the fastest growth were the United States
Table 1.1: Growth of SRI assets by region (as of late 2014).
2012 2014
SRI Assets % of Total AuM SRI Assets % of Total AuM Growth
Europe $ 8,758 49.0% $ 13,608 58.8% 55%
United States $ 3,740 20.2% $ 6,572 31.3% 76%
Canada $ 589 11.2% $ 945 17.9% 60%
Australia/NZ $ 134 12.5% $ 180 16.6% 34%
Asia $ 40 0.6% $ 53 0.8% 33%
Global $ 13,261 21.5% $ 21,358 30.2% 61%
Notes: Asset values are expressed in billions.
AuM: assets under mangement.
Source: GSIA (2014).
1The Global Sustainable Investment Alliance is a collaboration of membership-based sustainable investment
organizations around the world. Its mission is to deepen the impact and visibility of sustainable investment organi-
zations at the global level. Members of the GSIA are: European Sustainable Investment Forum (Eurosif), Respon-
sible Investment Association Australasia (RIAA), UK Sustainable Investment and Finance Association (UKSIF),
Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment (US SIF), Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable De-
velopment (VBDO).
8 CHAPTER 1. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT
Europe 63,7%
United States 30,8%
Canada 4,4%
Australia/NZ 0,8%
Asia 0,2%
Figure 1.1: Proportion of global SRI assets by region (as of late 2014). Data source: GSIA (2014).
(76% increase), followed by Canada (60% increase) and Europe (55%).
These three regions combined accounted for 99% of responsible investments, globally. Eu-
rope was the main contributor with 13.6 trillion dollars of SRI assets under management (63.7%
of the global total). Australia and Asia, although experiencing an average growth of 33%, ac-
counted for only 1% of the global SRI market (0.2% for Asia).
1.3.1 Drivers of SRI Demand
The European Fund andAssetManagement Association (EFAMA), on itsReport on Responsible
Investment (2014), identified the main drivers of SRI: strong demand from institutional asset
owners, international initiatives, legislation (especially at the European level), and an always
increasing attention from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and media.
Furthermore, following Paredes-Gazquez et al. (2014), the main driving forces of ESG inte-
gration can be classified into 3 main groups: market pressures, group pressures and institutional
pressures:
• Market pressures are the external forces promoting ESG integration and are mainly led by
investors and analysts.
• Group pressures refer to initiatives undertaken by members of the financial market to
integrate ESG information in the investment process.
• Institutional forces are those exerted by non-members of the financial market. These can
be divided in “light forces”, such as voluntary adopted initiatives, or “strong forces” like
regulation.
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In their study, the authors also identified the barriers to integration: technical impediments
and internal and external conventions.
Technical impediments are mainly related to the problems and difficulties in obtaining and
processing ESG information. Rating agencies and indices providers play a major role in helping
investors overcome these issues.
The term conventions here refers to common market practices and beliefs. The short-term
focus and the search for quick returns by investors, coupled with a widespread belief that social
and financial performance are negatively related, may have been an obstacle to the integration
of ESG issues in the investment processes. Many studies (some of which are reviewed in the
next chapter), in contrast, have proved that responsible investing does not destroy value, neither
for companies nor for investors.
1.3.2 Asset Owners and Asset Classes
In the asset owners category it is crucial to distinguish between retail and institutional investors.
Retail investors, active in the SRI field, are those individuals that, driven by their ethical and
moral principles, seek to invest in companies with positive social and environmental records.
Together with religious organizations, they were one of the driving forces of the SRI movement
during its development phase (Louche & Lydenberg, 2006). Institutional investors, on the other
hand, are large asset owners, such as pension funds and insurance companies, which, since the
late 1990s have become a major factor in the development of the SRI phenomenon.
As of 2014, institutionally held assets accounted for 86.9% of the SRI market (Europe, U.S.
and Canada only). Retail investing grew from 10.7% of 2010 to 13.1% of 2014. Europe is now
experiencing a significant increase in favour of retail investors who, in late 2015, held 22% of
SRI assets (against the 4% of 2013). This is mainly due to the launch of new products and a
growing trend to focus on private clients, like High Net Worth Individuals (Eurosif, 2016).
While SRI mainly developed as an equity focused investment style, its recent expansion has
lead asset owners to experiment and try to apply SRI principles to other assets classes. The most
notable ones are bonds (mostly corporate but also sovereign), real estate, cash and commodities.
Focusing on the European SRI market, equity accounted for over 30% of SRI assets in 2015,
an important decrease from the 50% of 2013. Bonds accounted for almost 64%, of which 51%
were corporate and 41% sovereign. The remaining were real estate, private equity, hedge funds
and commodities. The staggering growth experienced by the bond asset class is correlated to
the recent surge in popularity of Green bonds2.
2According to the International Capital Market Association’s (ICMA) definition, Green Bonds are “any type
of bond instrument where the proceeds will be exclusively applied to finance or re-finance in part or in full new
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1.3.3 ESG Rating Agencies and Indices Providers
Crucial in the process of implementing SRI strategies is the role of ESG analysis performed by
specialised rating agencies. By processing publicly available information reported by compa-
nies, NGOs and governmental organisations, these agencies provides investors with regularly
updated data, starting point for comparing companies’ ESG performances.
As reported by Novethic in their Overview of ESG Rating Agencies (2014), since the early
2000s, there has been a significant development of the ESG rating market, and it has recently
undergone a phase of consolidation. The market is, in fact, becoming more and more concen-
trated around the largest agencies which, through partnerships or acquisitions of smaller and
local ones, are now able to provide a wide range of services3 at the international level.
International Rating Agencies
What follows is a brief list of the most prominent international ESG rating agencies:
• EIRIS Ltd., a subsidiary of the EIRIS foundation, was established in 1983 in the United
Kingdom and, besides its London headquarters, it has offices in Paris, Boston and Wash-
ington. Their methodology consists in evaluating companies based on a set of 200 indi-
cators covering environment, stakeholder, human rights, and governance issues. For each
indicator, companies are assigned a grade expressing their level of commitment (limited,
intermediate, good, advanced).
• Inrate is a Switzerland based agency and one of the oldest in continental Europe. Over the
years it has established partnerships with universities, NGOs and other rating agencies.
Its activity is mainly focused on small capitalization companies and emerging markets.
• MSCI ESG Research, subsidiary of the MSCI group (Morgan Stanley Capital Interna-
tional), is one of the world’s largest provider of environment, social and governance re-
search. It currently is the result of a series of acquisition of different ESG analysis agen-
cies4. Each company in their analysed universe (more than 5000) is provided with a grade
and a sectoral review, highlighting the best andworst ESG practices. MSCI has also devel-
and/or existing eligible Green Projects and which are aligned with the four core components’ of the Green Bond
Principles (GBP).”
3Novethic lists 11 different types of services: ESG analysis of companies, analysis of countries, analysis of
supranational organisations and local governments, norm-based analysis, controversy alerts, engagement services,
governance and proxy voting,evaluation of portfolios, requested rating, analysis of “green bonds”, issuance of SRI
indices.
4In 2010, MSCI acquired RiskMetrics which had previously bought ISS (Institutional Shareholder service),
Innovest Strategic Value Advisors and KLD Research & Analytics.
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oped a wide family of ESG indices, covering different geographical areas and a multitude
of ESG thematics.
• Sustainalytics, a Netherlands based company founded in 2002, provides information on
more than 4500 companies worldwide assessing their ESG performance using sector spe-
cific indicators. In 2009 it mergedwith the Canadian Jantzi Research Inc. and collaborates
with STOXX Ltd. for its ESG and Sustainability index family.
• Vigeo, founded in 2002, is one of the European leading experts in the assessment of com-
panies’ practices and performances on ESG issues. In 2010 it created the Vigeo rating
brand, through which it provides companies’ ratings based on 38 ESG issues divided in
six fields: environment, human rights, human resources, community involvement, busi-
ness behaviour and corporate governance.
• Asset4 is a Swiss non-financial data provider founded in 2003 and acquired, in 2009, by
Thompson Reuters. Being the primary data source for this thesis, a more detailed review
of their methodology will be given in Chapter 4.
SRI Indices
Most of the aforementioned rating agencies also provide the service of creating and maintaining
SRI indices. While the main purpose is to serve as benchmarks or reference for SRI funds and
portfolios, they also play a crucial role in influencing ESG behaviour; companies are motivated
to improve their effort in the ESG field in order to be included in these renowned indices.
The most famous is the Domini 400 Social Index (DS 400) by KLD Research and Analytics.
Created in 1990, it was the first equity index compiled, starting from S&P 500 constituents,
following ESG and ethical criteria. Since the acquisition, in 2010, of RiskMetrics by the MSCI
Group, the index is known as the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index and is part of the MSCI’s ESG
index family.
Other important SRI index families are: Calvert Responsible Index series by Calvert Invest-
ments, FTSE4GOOD index series by the FTSE Group, Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI)
series and the STOXX ESG and Sustainability indices.
Among these, there are indices built focusing on specific themes (CO2 emission, controver-
sial weapons, etc.) and religious values (e.g. Catholic or Islamic indices).
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1.3.4 Initiatives
The strong development of SRI and the rise in importance given to ESG related issues of the last
decades has motivated important actors in the SRI field (associations5, think tanks, NGOs, stock
exchanges, national governments) to promote numerous initiatives. These are mainly aimed at
encouraging CSR disclosure and at providing guidelines and best practices for companies and
investors.
What follows is a list of the most relevant initiatives:
• The United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) is a partner-
ship, started in 1992, between the United Nations and the global financial sector, now
represented by more than 200 banks, insurer and investors from 51 countries. Its goal is
to create an environment that helps financial institutions to integrate sustainable develop-
ment policies into their operations.
• TheUNGlobal Compact, described as a global multi-stakeholder network, aims at helping
companies to meet their commitments to operate responsibly and support society. Com-
panies are asked to embrace a set of core principles in the area of human rights, labour
standards, environment and corruption.
• The UNEP FI and the Global Compact are both supporters of The United Nations Princi-
ples for Responsible Investment initiative (UN PRI), launched in 2006. It is based on 6
principles 6 and has the aim of promoting the incorporation of ESG issues into mainstream
investment decision-making and ownership practices. It has almost 1500 signatories rep-
resenting 60 trillion dollars of assets under management.
• The OECD Guidelines are recommendations addressed by governments to multinational
enterprise (MNEs) operating in or from the adhering countries. They provide principles
for responsible business consistent with applicable laws and internationally recognised
standards.
• The Sustainable Stock Exchanges initiative (SSE), founded in 2009, is a global platform
for exchanges to engage with policy makers, investors, companies and regulators with the
aim of creating more sustainable and transparent capital markets. Exchanges, partners of
5Most of these associations are built on the model of the social investment forum (SIF).
61.Incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision making;2.Incorporate ESG issues into own-
ership policies and practices;3.Seek ESG disclosure;4.Promote the PRI principles within the financial indus-
try;5.Work cooperatively to implement the PRI principles;6.Report on progress in implementing the PRI principles.
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the SSE, are committed to promote improved ESG disclosure and performance among its
listed companies 7.
• The Global Impact Investing Network is a nonprofit organization aimed at increasing
the scale and effectiveness of impact investing. Its activity consists in providing critical
infrastructure and in supporting activities, education, and research, in order to accelerate
the development of a coherent impact investing industry. Since 2009 it promotes the
IRIS initiative, a catalog of generally accepted performance metrics used by investors,
investment funds, companies, and foundations to track their social, environmental, and
financial achievements.
• In November 2004, Eurosif, together with its national members, created the European
SRI Transparency Guidelines (Now known as Transparency code) aimed at increasing
the accountability and transparency of SRI products to users. The code has become a
widely used tool and it has been made mandatory for French and Belgium SRI funds.
At the end of 2013 there were more than 500 signatories fund, representing an important
share of the SRI market.
1.4 SRI Strategies
Following Louche and Lydenberg (2010), four main types of SRI strategies can be identified:
avoidance, inclusion, relative selection, and engagement.
• Avoidance strategy consists in avoiding companies engaged in businesses or practices
deemed unacceptable or harmful to society.
• Inclusion strategy, as opposed to Avoidance, is implemented by investing in companies
involved in businesses or practices considered to be particularly beneficial to society.
• Relative selection is aimed at selecting the best performing companies in terms of ESG
criteria in each sector or industry.
• Engagement implies active collaboration with companies in order to influence their be-
haviour and improve their ESG performance.
These strategies are not mutually exclusives; investors can implement them independently or
combined.
7For a comprehensive list of partners see SSE’s website at http://www.sseinitiative.org/sse-partner
-exchanges/list-of-partner-exchanges/ (accessed October 3, 2016).
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1.4.1 SRI Strategies in Europe
Consistent with the aforementioned classification, Eurosif, in their 2016 study (Eurosif, 2016),
distinguished between 7 categories of SRI strategies:8:
Exclusion or Negative Screening is a strategy which involves removing from the investment
universe specific investments or classes of investments, such as companies, sectors or
countries. There is not a single criterion for negative screening and motivations may vary
from risk-management to value-based. The most common practice is the exclusion of
companies which are involved in so-called “sin” activities. For example, for their ESG
and Sustainability Index family, STOXX Ltd. excludes companies which are involved
with alcohol, tobacco, gambling, weapons and pornography. As stated by Louche et al.
(2012) the underlying principle is “do no harm”.
Investors who are more concerned with environmental issues may decide to exclude activ-
ities such as production and distribution of agrochemicals, animal testing, nuclear energy
production and genetically modified organisms (GMO) research. Faith driven investors,
instead, may exclude companies producing abortifacients and contraceptives or involved
with embryonic stem cell research.
Norm-based Screening is the assessment, for each company held in the portfolio, of its com-
pliance with specific environmental, social and governance standards. These standards
are most commonly based on internationals norms or treaties such as The United Nation
Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
This strategy is most popular in the Nordic countries where, coupled with engagement
activities, covers the majority of the SRI assets.
Engagement and voting by shareholders on ESG matters. It is a long-term process whose
goal is to influence companies behaviour and increase disclosure. It involves dialogue
and collaboration between management and investors (Eurosif, 2013).
ESG Integration is the explicit inclusion, by asset managers, of ESG risks and opportunities
into traditional financial analysis and investment decisions based on a systematic process
and apropriate research sources.
Best-in-Class typically involves selecting the top percentage of companies, within a sector or
an investment universe (Best-in-Universe), based on ESG criteria. It is also referred to as
positive screening.
8The strategies are listed by popularity as of 2016.
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Figure 1.2: SRI assets per strategy (EUR in millions). Data source: Eurosif (2016).
*Compounded Annual Growth rate.
Sustainability Themed is investing following specific themes related to ESG issues (climate
change, energy efficiency, etc.). This type of strategy is usually aimed at supporting com-
panies and industries in the process of transitioning to more sustainable practices. Themed
investing may also provide some degree of de-correlation to other investments present in
investors’ portfolios.
Impact Investing is, according the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN), the investment
made into companies, organisation and funds with the intention to generate social and
environmental impact alongside a financial return. Key aspects of Impact Investing are
the intentionality, the measurability of the social impact and the expectation of financial
returns.
As shown in figure 1.2, in late 2015, exclusions based strategies were the most adopted, cov-
ering around 10 trillion euro of assets under management. Norm-based screening and Engage-
ment and Voting followed with 5 and 4.3 trillion euro, respectively. The least applied strategy,
although experiencing an exceptional rate of growth (385% in the 2013-2015 biennium), was
impact investing with 98 billion euro.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter provides a review of existing studies aimed at comparing the performance of So-
cially Responsible Investments versus conventional forms of investments, where conventional
means that no SRI strategy is applied to the investment process.
2.1 Hypotheses
According to Hamilton, Jo, and Statman (1993) and, more recently, Statman and Glushkov
(2009), there are three alternative hypotheses addressing the relative returns of stocks of so-
cially responsible companies and conventional companies.
The reasoning behind these hypotheses could be explained in terms of competitive advan-
tages or disadvantages, at company level, resulting from acting socially responsible (Porter &
van der Linde, 1995; Walley &Whitehead, 1994). However, as Derwall et al. (2005) suggested,
the measure in which ESG policies contribute to investment returns ultimately depends on the
financial markets’ ability to factor the financial consequences of corporate social responsibility
into share prices.
2.1.1 Doing Good but not Well
The first hypothesis is the “doing good but not well” (Statman & Glushkov, 2009), where the
risk-adjusted expected returns of socially responsible stocks are lower than the risk-adjusted ex-
pected returns of conventional stocks. This hypothesis is consistent with the idea that the market
prices social responsibility characteristics and that socially responsible investors have an impact
on stock returns. This type of investors are willing to sacrifice financial returns, to some extent,
in exchange of social performance. By driving down the expected returns and, consequently, the
cost of capital, they increase the value of socially responsible companies relative to the value
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of conventional companies. As a result, socially responsible companies are overvalued with
respect to conventional ones.
2.1.2 Doing Good While Doing Well
The “doing good while doing well” hypothesis states that the expected returns of socially re-
sponsible stocks are higher than those of conventional stocks. This is possible if investors, and
managers, consistently underestimate the benefits of acting according to socially responsible
standards and, at the same time, overestimate its costs. Investors may also underestimate the
probability that negative information may be released about non socially responsible compa-
nies. In this regard, Hamilton et al. (1993) made the example that conventional investors may
be consistently underestimating the probability that oil companies will find themselves in trou-
ble because of oil spills. If oil spills actually occurs, the companies stocks’ prices will decline
resulting in lower returns for conventional investors while not affecting the returns of socially
responsible investors who refrained from investing in those companies.
2.1.3 No Effect
Last is the “no effect” hypothesis where there are no significant differences between the ex-
pected returns of socially responsible and conventional stocks. This may occur if the social
responsibility components of the stocks are not priced by the market. Unlike the case of “doing
good but not well”, investors that sell stocks of non socially responsible companies find enough
conventional investors ready to buy them that the prices do not drop. The “no effect” hypothe-
sis might also be true if the effects of social responsibility consistent with the “doing good but
not well” hypothesis are counterbalanced by those consistent with the “doing good while doing
well”.
2.1.4 Missed Diversification Opportunities
In addition to these three hypotheses, which mainly focus on the performance of companies’
stocks, considerations regarding optimal portfolio construction and performance needs to be
made. As Becchetti, Ciciretti, Dalò, and Herzel (2015) well explained, when socially respon-
sible investors exclude assets from their investment universe, because of negative screening or
Best-in-Class strategies, they introduce additional constraints in their optimal portfolio variance
minimization problem, requiring the share invested in those assets to be zero. This entails that
their efficient frontier shifts to the right and appears flatter than that of conventional investors.
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For the same level of expected return, the risk (measured by the standard deviation) is higher,
meaning that SRI strategies can be costly in terms of missed diversification opportunities.
The following section will be dedicated at describing the methodology used in the existing
literature to test and verify the aforementioned hypotheses.
2.2 Methodologies
The most common approach used in the literature to test whether the stocks’ performance of SR
companies differ significantly from those of conventional ones is by means of Jensen’s alpha
(Jensen, 1968).
In the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964), a single-factor
model, the Jensen’s alpha is obtained by regressing the stock’s excess returns (returns minus
the risk-free rate) on the excess returns of the market portfolio.1 The constant in the regression,
estimated through OLS, is the Jensen’s alpha, which represents the part of stock’s return which
is not explained by its level of systematic risk (measured by its beta).
Multi-factor models, which take into account the exposure to additional risk factors, are also
widely used. The most renowned is the Fama-French three factor model (Fama & French, 1993,
1996). Fama and French added two additional explanatory variables in the regression, the Small
Minus Big factor (SMB) and the High Minus Low factor (HML). The SMB factor, computed
as the difference in returns between a small capitalization and a large capitalization portfolio,
measures the exposure to small size risk, while the HML factor, calculated as the difference
in returns between a portfolio of companies with high book-to-market ratios and a portfolio of
companies with low book-to-market ratios, captures the exposure to bankruptcy risk.
Carhart (1997) extended the three factor model by adding a momentum factor (MOM). Mo-
mentum is constructed as the difference in returns between a portfolio of stocks which exhibited
relatively high returns in the past year and a portfolio of stocks which exhibited relatively low
returns in the same time frame. It measures the tendency of stocks that performed well (badly)
in the last year to continue to perform well (badly) in the future.
Spanning test (De Roon&Nijman, 2001; Huberman&Kandel, 1987) is often used in studies
aimed at comparing the efficient frontier built on a restricted investment universe, in which assets
are excluded, for example, based on their ESG performance, and the one corresponding to an
unrestricted investment universe. It is a regression based test used to check if the difference
between the efficient frontiers is statistically significant or only due to sampling error.
De Roon, Nijman, and Werker (2001) extended the spanning test in order to account for
1A broad market index is often used as a proxy for the market portfolio.
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market frictions such as short-sale restrictions and transaction costs, while Zhou and Kan (2012)
proposed a step-down procedure to test if the exclusion of some assets decreases diversification
opportunities in terms of foregone returns (1st step) or foregone risk reduction (2nd step).
2.3 Results
In one of the first studies of its kind, Hamilton et al. (1993) measured the excess returns for
32 socially responsible equity mutual funds using monthly returns for the period 1981-1990.
By using a single-factor model, they found that, for the majority of the SRI funds, the Jensen’s
alphas were not significantly different from zero. Based on those results they concluded that the
market did not price social responsibility characteristics and that investors could have expected
to lose nothing by investing in SRI mutual funds.
Diltz (1995), using a sample of 159 US firms and daily returns for the period encompass-
ing the years 1989 to 1991, estimated the difference in Jensen’s alpha for fourteen pairs of
portfolios.2 The author found that certain ethical screens, in particular good environmental per-
formance, lack of military work, and lack of nuclear industry involvement, may enhance port-
folio performance. Through cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) analyses, Diltz also
found that enhanced portfolio performance may come from environmental and charitable giving
screens, while negative effects may be obtained from family benefits screen. Overall, the author
interpreted his findings to be consistent with the notion that ethical screening neither helps nor
hinders portfolio performance.
Stone, Guerard, Gultekin, and Adams (2001) studied how social screening impacted active
portfolio management during period from 1984 to 1997. Using stocks data from three databases3
and rating from KLD Research & Analytics, they found no statistically significant costs nor
benefits to such practice.
Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin (2003) studied whether investors pay a “price” by allocating
their wealth to socially responsible equity mutual funds. The results strongly depended on what
fraction of their portfolios investors decided to restrict to SRI funds and on their prior beliefs
about pricing models and managerial skill. Investors who strongly believed in the CAPM and
ruled out managerial skill (such as a market index investor) paid a small price for their SRI
restrictions. Same result for investors whose allocation to SRI funds was small. Instead, the
costs associated with socially responsible investing became more significant as investors be-
liefs shifted towards Fama-French or Carhart multi-factor models and when they relied on fund
2The first portfolio in each pair consisted of all sample firms which received the highest rating for a particular
rating screen, while the second consisted of all sample firms which received the lowest rating.
3CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and I/B/E/S.
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manager skill.
Bauer, Koedijk, and Otten (2005) used Carhart’s four-factor model to test the significance
of the difference in risk-adjusted returns between ethical and conventional mutual funds for
the 1990-2001 period.4 Although they found no evidence of statistically significant difference
in returns between the two type of mutual fund, they documented that ethical mutual funds
exhibited distinct investment styles.5 They also investigated the relative performance of ethical
mutual funds through time, finding that, after a period of under-performance in the beginning of
the 1990’s, they experienced a catching-up phase which brought their performance on par with
that of conventional funds for the 1998-2001 period.
Derwall et al. (2005) focused on the concept of eco-efficiency6. They created two equity
portfolios that differed in eco-efficiency ratings. After controlling for common risk factors,
using a four-factor model and industry specific factors, they found that the high-rated portfolio
significantly outperformed its low-rated counterpart over the 1995-2003 period. Their results
remained significant also after accounting for different levels of transaction costs.
Barnett and Salomon (2006) hypothesized, based onmodern portfolio theory and stakeholder
theories, that the financial loss encountered by SRI funds due to poor diversification may be
offset as the degree of social screening increases because better managed and more stable firms
are selected. They found evidence for their hypothesis by means of an empirical test on a panel
of 61 SRI funds from 1972 to 2000. Their results showed that, as the number of social screens
used by a SRI fund increased, financial returns initially declined, but then, when the number of
screens reached a maximum, these started to rise. Consistent with their hypothesis, they found
a curvilinear relationship between financial and social performance.
Kempf and Osthoff (2007) investigated the impact of different socially responsible criteria
(positive screening, best-in-class, negative screening) on the performance of stock portfolios.
Using ratings from KLD Research & Analytics and stocks from the S&P 500 and DS 400 in-
dices they built two portfolios, one with high SRI rated companies and the other with low rated
companies.7 Using the Carhart four-factor model, they measured portfolios performances dur-
ing the period 1992-2004 finding that a long-short strategy, long on high rated companies and
short on low rated ones, yielded a significantly positive alpha.8 Checking for reasonable levels
of transaction costs did not change their results. Another interesting result was that the two port-
4They used an international database containing 103 German, UK and US ethical mutual funds.
5They found that ethical funds are typically less exposed to market return variability and more growth-oriented
(lower beta for the HML factor) compared to conventional funds.
6Eco-efficiency is here intended as the economic value a company creates relative to the waste it generates.
7Both a value-weighted and an equally-weighted (as a robustness check) weighting scheme were used for
constructing the portfolios.
8The Best-in-Class screening approach was the one that lead to the highest alphas up to 8.7% per year.
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folios differed in the exposure level to the HML factor, with the high-rated portfolio showing a
lower factor-loading.
Schröder (2007) aimed its study at comparing the risk-return characteristics of SRI equity in-
dices9 with those of conventional indices (or benchmark indices). The analysis was conducted
by regressing the excess returns of the SRI indices on the excess returns of the benchmarks,
both in a single and a multi-equation framework. The results neither revealed a significant out-
performance nor an under-performance of the SRI indices compared to the benchmarks (alphas
in the regressions not significantly different from zero). Instead, most of the SRI indices exhib-
ited higher risk compared to conventional counterparts (beta significantly bigger than 1).
Renneboog, ter Horst, and Zhang (2007) focused on the SRImutual fund industry to test their
hypothesis that ethical and social considerations have an effect on stock prices and that investors
pay a price (the price of ethics, as they called it) for the use of SRI screening. Their sample was
made of SRI and conventional equity funds from 23 different countries10 and covered the period
1991-2003. By means of multi-factor analysis they found that the risk-adjusted returns of the
average SRI fund in the UK and US were not statistically different from those of an average
conventional fund. Instead, the average SRI fund in the majority of European and Asia-Pacific
countries strongly underperformed its conventional counterpart. They also found evidence of
what they called a “smart money” effect in the SRI fund industry; ethical investors, while unable
to identify the SRI funds that would have outperformed their benchmarks in subsequent periods,
were able to identify ethical funds that would have performed poorly. Lastly, in accordance with
Barnett and Salomon (2006) study, the data showed that the performance of SRI funds increased
with the number of SRI screens employed, supporting the hypothesis that screening processes
generates value-relevant non-public information.
Statman and Glushkov (2009), in a study that strongly resembles that of Kempf and Osthoff
(2007), both inmethodology and data, analysed the effects of Best-in-Class and ethical screening
strategies on portfolio excess returns. What partially differentiated their study from Kempf and
Osthoff (2007), apart from the inclusion of three additional years of data, is how they treated
the ratings provided by KLD Research & Analytics11. Despite the differences, their results were
consistent with those obtained by the other authors; stock portfolios of high-rated companies
out-performed portfolios of low-rated ones while the exclusion of stocks of companies involved
929 SRI equity indices representing different SRI screening procedures and covering different investment re-
gions (global, Europe, and specific countries such as Australia, Sweden, the UK and the US).
10More specifically: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, UK (including Guernsey and the Isle of Man), USA, Australia, Canada, Cayman Islands,
Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands Antilles, Singapore, and South Africa.
11They excluded from their analysis the group of companies that had no indicators of strength and no indicators
of concern during the year because that group likely included companies that KLD had not examined even if they
were on its list while Kempf and Osthoff (2007) included them.
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in “sin” activities determined a significant loss in performance. They concluded that the effects
of Best-in-Class and ethical screening strategies tend to offset each other.
Galema et al. (2009), in a study related to that of Schröder (2007), used spanning tests to
determine whether investors sustain a loss, in diversification terms, by excluding non socially
responsible assets from their portfolio. In particular, by applying tests from De Roon et al.
(2001) and Zhou and Kan (2012), they tried to answer three main questions:
1. Does restricting the universe to socially responsible stocks decreases diversification op-
portunities of investors in terms of foregone returns?
2. Does restricting the universe to socially responsible stocks decreases diversification op-
portunities of investors in terms of foregone risk reduction opportunities?
3. Does restricting the universe to socially responsible stocks decreases diversification op-
portunities of investors when they are subject to short sales constraints?
They used stock returns for more than 2000 North American companies for the period 1991-
2004 and distinguished between five dimensions of social responsibility: environment, social,
corporate governance, product and sin. For each dimension they built a SRI portfolio, made
of only stock deemed socially responsible by KLD, and one of excluded assets.12 Tests results
evidenced that investors, when not imposing short-selling restrictions, were worse off for every
dimension of social responsibility except for governance. However, the step-down procedure
showed that these investors paid a price only in terms of foregone risk reduction opportuni-
ties and not in terms of foregone returns. For investors facing short-selling restriction the null
hypothesis of spanning held for all 5 dimensions, meaning that these type of investors, such as
many individuals, mutual funds and pension funds, were not worse off in terms of diversification
opportunities.
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) investigated the effects of social norms on equity markets by
focusing only on “sin” stocks.13 They hypothesized that investors, in particular institutional
ones, subject to norms, pay a financial costs in abstaining from investing in these stocks. They
indeed found that “sin” stocks are less held by norm-constrained investors, such as pension plans,
compared to mutual or hedge funds and that they receive less analysts coverage than comparable
stocks. Using data from 1965 to 2006 for NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks, they observed
that a portfolio long in “sin” stocks and short on comparable non “sin” stocks had significantly
positive excess returns after controlling for Fama-French’s three factors, Carhart’s momentum
and firm characteristics. Their results support the hypothesis of “Doing good but not well”; the
12They built their portfolios by using both a value-weighted and an equally-weighted scheme.
13They considered companies involved in producing alcohol, tobacco and gaming.
24 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
exclusion of these companies from investors portfolios increases their cost of capital resulting
in stock prices which are under-valued respect to their fundamentals.
Herzel et al. (2012), similarly to Galema et al. (2009), examined the effects of including
socially responsible related constraints in optimal portfolio decision-making. Their investment
universe was based on the components of the S&P 500 index from 1993 to 2008 and they focused
on the three main dimensions of social responsibility: environment, social and governance. The
SRI constraints consisted of eliminating from the investments set, for each one of the three
dimensions, the worst performing companies.14. They found that SRI screening resulted in a
small loss in terms of Sharpe ratio while it had a great impact on the market capitalization of the
optimal portfolio. They performed spanning tests both with and without imposing short-sales
restrictions and the results showed that, when short-selling was allowed, the null hypothesis of
spanning was almost always rejected, meaning that the two frontiers, the one available to a SRI
investor and the one available to a conventional investor, were significantly different. Opposite
results in the case of short-sales restrictions, whereby the hypothesis of spanning was rejected
only when excluding from the investment universe more than 30% of the worst companies based
on environment ratings.
More recently, Becchetti et al. (2015) studied the performance of socially responsible and
conventional funds in different markets during the 1992-2012 period. They adopted single and
multi-factor models as well as a ”nearest neighbour” approach15 to estimate the difference be-
tween the alphas for the two investment styles (socially responsible and conventional). They
found that there was not a clear dominance of one investment style over the other for the entire
period, meaning that the diversification cost, due to excluding certain assets, does not compro-
mise the performance of SRI funds. Analysing different time segments they found that, during
the period following the global financial crisis, SRI funds outperformed conventional ones play-
ing a sort of “insurance role” against ethical risk factors.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
What most of these studies seems to agree with is that, exception made for some specific cases
(time periods, geographical regions, screening methodologies), Socially Responsible Invest-
ments, whether in the form of funds, indices or portfolios, do not tend to exhibit significant
performance differences with respect to their conventional counterparts. Instead, they tend to
14They repeated their analysis using four different thresholds excluding the worst 10%, 30%, 50% and an all-
concern screening.
15The approach consisted in matching SRI and conventional funds that are as close as possible in terms of
exposition to risk factors.
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show a significantly different exposure to common risk factors (Fama-French) and different
investment styles.
Furthermore, examining the effects of the exclusion of non-SRI assets from the investment
universe, two main results needs to be highlighted:
1. Losses in terms of diversification opportunities are mainly due to foregone risk reduction
opportunities and not in terms of foregone returns.
2. These losses tend to disappear when investors are faced with short-sales restrictions.
Overall, according to the studies here reviewed, the “no effect” hypothesis seems to be the
most plausible one and, from a socially responsible investor point of view, this represents a
positive result.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
This chapter provides a description of the methodology employed in the empirical research.
3.1 Mean-Variance Frontier
First introduced by Markowitz, the concept of mean-variance frontier is a crucial component of
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and plays a fundamental role in portfolio selection problems.
MPT is built upon the assumption that investors are risk-averse; between two portfolios, offering
the same level of return, they will always choose the less risky alternative.
In this context, the efficient frontier represents the set of portfolios satisfying the condition
that, for the same level of risk, no other portfolio exists offering a higher level of expected return.
3.1.1 Optimal Portfolios
Considering a set of N assets, let µ be the vector of expected returns and Σ the covariance
matrix. A specific optimal portfolio is the solution to the following problem:
min
w
w′Σw
s.t. w′µ = µp,0
N∑
i=1
wi = 1,
(3.1)
where w′Σw is the portfolio variance or σ2p , w′µ is the portfolio expected return or µp, w is
the vector of asset weights (proportion of wealth invested in the available assets) and µp,0 is
the target return. The first constraint imposes that the portfolio return should match the target
return, while the second requires that the available wealth is fully invested.
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The solution to the optimization problem is given by
w∗ = AΣ
−1ιN −BΣ−1µ
∆ +
CΣ−1µ−BΣ−1ιN
∆ µp,0,
(3.2)
where
A = µ′Σ−1µ B = ι′NΣ1µ C = ι′NΣ1ιN
and
∆ = AC −B2,
with ιN being a N -dimension vector of ones.
From 3.2 is possible to derive a relation between µp and σ2p of the optimal portfolios:
σ2p =
C
∆µ
2
p −
2B
∆ µp +
A
∆ .
This relation, which links a return level with the variance of the optimal portfolio, is the mean-
variance frontier and is represented, in the (σ2p, µp) plane, as a hyperbola. Since standard devi-
ation, or volatility, σp is expressed in the same units as the returns µp, is common practice to
represent the frontier in the (σp, µp) plane instead.
The efficient frontier is the portion of the hyperbola that lies above its vertex. The portfolio
located on the vertex is called the Global Minimum Variance (GMV) portfolio and it is the
solution to the following problem:
min
w
w′Σw
s.t.
N∑
i=1
wi = 1.
(3.3)
The weights of the GMV portfolio are given by
wGMV =
Σ−1ιN
ι′NΣ−1ιN
.
The points lying below the vertex, while still solutions to the problem in 3.1, do not represent
efficient portfolios; for the same level of risk, there exist a portfolio, on the efficient frontier,
offering a higher level of return.
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3.1.2 Efficient Frontier with a Risk-Free Asset
Besides investing only in risky assets, investors may also allocate part of their wealth on a risk-
free asset, characterized by null standard deviation.
When the investment universe also includes a risk-free asset, the optimization problem ex-
pressed in 3.1 becomes
min
w
w′Σw
s.t. w′µ+ (1− w′ιN)Rf = µp,0,
(3.4)
where w now represents the portion of wealth invested only in risky assets, 1−w′ιN the portion
of wealth invested in the risk-free asset and Rf the risk-free rate.
The set of efficient portfolios can be derived as before, and it is now represented, in the
(σp, µp) plane, as a straight line originating from the (0, Rf ) point. This is the so-called Cap-
ital Market Line (CML) and its slope, which coincides with the Sharpe ratio of the efficient
portfolios, is given by
µp −Rf
σp
= Shp.
There exists a value of µp,0 for which the problem in 3.4 yields a solution, w, such that
w′ιN = 1.
In this case, the optimal portfolio is made of only risky assets and, therefore, it is also a solution
to the problem in 3.1. Referred to as the Tangency, or Maximum Sharpe (MS) portfolio, it is
located on the tangency point between the CML and the efficient frontier of risky assets only.
Exploiting the Sharpe ratio definition, theMS portfolio composition can be found by solving
the following problem:
max
w
w′µ−Rf
w′Σw
s.t.
N∑
i=1
wi = 1.
The solution to which is given by
wMS =
Σ−1(µ− ιNRf )
ι′NΣ−1(µ− ιNRf )
.
and its Sharpe ratio is equal to
ShMS = ((µ− ιNRf )′Σ−1(µ− ιNRf ))1/2. (3.5)
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Each portfolio located on the Capital Market Line can be obtained as a combination of the
risk-free asset and the Tangency portfolio.
3.1.3 Positivity Constraints
Solving the variance minimizing problems in 3.1 and 3.4 often leads to portfolios characterized
by extreme positions (extremely high negative and/or positive asset weights) which are infea-
sible to real world investors. The most common limitation investors are faced with, whether
institutional or retail, is the no short-selling restriction. This imposes not to assume negative
positions (go short) on the available assets.
To accommodate for this restriction, the optimization problem in 3.1 is subject to an addi-
tional constraint:
min
w
w′Σw
s.t. w′µ = µp,0
N∑
i=1
wi = 1
wi ≥ 0 i = 1, ..., N.
(3.6)
Because of the inequality constraint, the problem in 3.6 does not have an analytical solution as
for the unconstrained case; it must be solved by using numerical methods (like the quadprog or
fmincon functions in MATLAB).
The efficient frontier in the case of short-sales restrictions is lower bounded by the GMV
portfolio, computed as in 3.3 with the addition of the positivity constraint, and upper bounded by
a portfolio characterized by a 100% position in the asset with the highest expected return. Com-
pared to the unrestricted one, because of limited diversification opportunities, the constrained
efficient frontier is shifted to the right and down on the (σp, µp) plane.
The positivity constraint also affects the slope of the Capital Market Line; the Sharpe ratio
of the MS portfolio with short-sales restriction will always be lower than or equal to the Sharpe
ratio of its unrestricted counterpart.
3.2 Parameters Estimation
The composition of the optimal portfolios, solution to the variance minimizing problems seen
in the previous section, depends on µ, the assets expected returns, and Σ, the covariance matrix.
Since the true values are unknown, both µ and Σ need to be estimated from observed returns.
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This section will be dedicated at describing two common estimation approaches.1
3.2.1 Sample Moments
Given a sample of a multivariate series of returns Rt, t = 1, . . . , T , estimates for µ and Σ can
be computed as the sample moments
µ̂ = 1
T
T∑
t=1
Rt. (3.7)
and
Σ̂ = 1
T
T∑
t=1
(Rt − µ̂)(Rt − µ̂)′ = 1
T
T∑
t=1
RtR
′
t − µ̂µ̂′.
More specifically, the diagonal elements of Σ̂ are the individual assets variance estimators
σ̂2i = 1T
∑T
t=1(Ri,t − µ̂i)2, and the off-diagonal elements are the covariances estimators between
asset pairs σ̂ij = 1T
∑T
t=1(Ri,t − µ̂i)(Rj,t − µ̂j).
Employing the sample covariance matrix may be problematic when the matrix dimension
(which coincides with the number of assetsN ) is large compared to the number of observations
(T ). In these scenarios, the sample covariance matrix, although being an unbiased estimator, is
estimated with a lot of error and may perform poorly (Fan, Fan, & Lv, 2008; Ledoit & Wolf,
2004a, 2004b). When N is greater than T the estimated covariance matrix becomes singular
and, therefore, cannot be used as parameter in portfolio selection problems.
To overcome these issues is common practice to impose some structure on the estimator of
Σ. This can be achieved through the specification of a factor model.
3.2.2 Factor Models2
Factor models are used to explain assets returns by exploiting their exposure to a certain number
of common variables called factors (or risk factors). Depending on the type of factors employed,
it is possible to distinguish between macroeconomic factor models and fundamental factor mod-
els. The first category relies on observable macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth rate
or inflation rate, while the second on observable asset characteristics like the book-to-market
ratio.
1Just for this section, bold characters will be used in the notation to help differentiate vectors and matrices from
scalar values.
2This section follows the approach used in Statistics and Data Analysis for Financial Engineering by Ruppert
(2011).
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A factor model is expressed as follows:
Ri,t = αi + β1,iF1,t + β2,iF2,t + · · ·+ βK,iFK,t + ϵi,t i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (3.8)
where Ri,t is now the excess return of the i-th asset at time t, F1,t, F2,t, . . . , FK,t are the values
of the K factors at time t, ϵi,t is a mean-zero variable that represents the individual risk of the
ith asset and αi is the part of the return not explained by the model (abnormal return). In factor
models is common to assume that the ϵ terms are uncorrelated across assets, meaning that the
cross-correlation between returns is only due to the factors.
The βk,i parameter is the factor loading and expresses the exposure, or sensitivity, of the i-th
asset returns to the k risk factor. The factor loadings are unknown and must be estimated by
means of times-series regression.
Expected Returns and Covariance Matrix Estimation
Using the factor model in 3.8, the expected return for asset i can be written as
E(Ri,t) = αi + β1,iE(F1,t) + β2,iE(F2,t) + · · ·+ βK,iE(FK,t). (3.9)
Let
β′i = (β1,i, β2,i, . . . , βK,i)
be the vector of factor loadings for the i-th asset,
F ′t = (F1,t, F2,t, . . . , FK,t)
the vector of K factors at time t and suppose that ΣF is the K × K covariance matrix of Ft.
The variance for the i-th asset returns is
V ar(Ri,t) = β′iΣFβi + σ2ϵ,i.
And, for any i ̸= j, the covariance between two assets is
Cov(Ri,t, Rj,t) = β′iΣFβj.
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More generally, let
β =

β1,1 . . . β1,j . . . β1,N
... . . . ... . . . ...
βK,1 . . . βK,j . . . βK,N

be the matrix of loadings and
α′ = (α1, α2, . . . , αN)
the vector of intercepts.
Equation 3.8 can be rewritten, using matrix notation, as
Rt = α+ β′Ft + ϵt,
where
ϵ′t = (ϵ1, ϵ2, . . . , ϵN).
The vector of expected returns is
E(Rt) = α+ β′E(Ft)
and the N ×N covariance matrix ofRt is given by
ΣR = β′ΣFβ +Σϵ,
where Σϵ is the N ×N diagonal covariance matrix of ϵt
Σϵ =

σ2ϵ,1 . . . 0 . . . 0
... . . . ... . . . ...
0 . . . σ2ϵ,j . . . 0
... . . . ... . . . ...
0 . . . 0 . . . σ2ϵ,N

.
TheΣϵ matrix is diagonal because of the assumption that specific risk factors are not correlated
across assets.
Estimates for βi and αi are obtained from the time-series regression of the realized excess
returns on the observable risk factors. The covariance matrix of the factor realizations may be
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estimated using the sample covariance matrix
Σ̂F =
1
T − 1
T∑
t=1
(Ft − F )(Ft − F )′, F = 1
T
T∑
t=1
Ft.
Compared to the sample covariancematrix described in the previous section, whenN is large
and K is relatively small, the factor model approach requires estimating fewer parameters thus
determining an increase in overall precision. More specifically, whereas the sample covariance
matrix containsN(N +1)/2 estimates, the factor model requires estimatingN ×K parameters
in β,K2 inΣF andN inΣϵ, for a total ofNK+N+K2. As an example, assuming the number
of assets is 500 and the number of factors is 4,N(N +1)/2 = 125, 250 whileNK+N +K2 =
2, 516.
A downside of the factor model is that, in case of model misspecification, the estimate for
ΣR will be biased. This is especially the case when Σϵ is not diagonal as per assumption.
Equilibrium Returns
The CAPM and the Black-Littermanmodel for asset allocation (Black & Litterman, 1991, 1992)
are based on the assumption that financial markets, in the long run, tend to be in a state of
equilibrium. Markets are in equilibrium when the supply of financial activities matches the
demand.
If assets returns are believed to be generated by a factor model such as the one in 3.8, the
equilibrium assumption implies that there should not be abnormal returns, that is, the intercept
in the regression must be equal to zero.
Under the equilibrium assumption, equation 3.9 for computing expected returns becomes
E(Ri,t) = β1,iE(F1,t) + β2,iE(F2,t) + · · ·+ βK,iE(FK,t) .
Equilibrium returns are determined only by the assets exposure to the risk factors.
3.3 Testing Mean-Variance Efficiency
An important question, in the subject of portfolio analysis, is whether expanding the investment
universe, by including an additional set of risky assets, can lead to a significant improvement
in terms of mean-variance opportunities. Numerous tests have been proposed trying to address
this type of question; most notably the mean-variance efficiency test proposed by Jobson (1982)
and Gibbons et al. (1989) that will be here described following the approach used by Pastorello
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(2001).
3.3.1 Testing Efficiency in the Presence of a Risk-Free Asset
As described in section 3.1.2, when investors are faced with the possibility of allocating part
of their wealth on a risk-free asset, the set of efficient portfolios is represented, in the (σ, µ)
plane, by the Capital Market Line. The slope of the CML is given by the Sharpe ratio of the MS
portfolio attainable by investing in risky assets only.
Let now consider two sets of risky assets: one of K benchmark assets and an augmented
one that, besides the benchmark assets, includesN additional test assets. If the CML relative to
the first set does not significantly differ from the one relative to the larger set, then, expanding
the investment universe (with the test assets) does not determine an improvement in terms of
mean-variance opportunities.
Exploiting the properties of the CML, the problem it’s equivalent to verify the following set
of hypothesis: 
H0 : Sh− Sh0 = 0
H1 : Sh− Sh0 > 0
, (3.10)
where Sh0 is the maximum Sharpe ratio achievable with the benchmark assets only and Sh the
one attainable with theK +N assets.
Using the subscripts 0 and 1 to refer to the K benchmark assets and N test assets, respec-
tively, the vector of expected excess returns and the covariance matrix of the N +K assets can
be defined as
µ = E(Rt) =
µ0
µ1
 , Σ = V ar(Rt) =
Σ00 Σ01
Σ10 Σ11
 .
Following Gibbons et al. (1989), the hypotheses in 3.10 can be tested using the regression
R1,t = α + βR0,t + ϵt, (3.11)
with E(ϵt) = 0N and E(ϵtR′0,t) = 0N×K , where 0N is a N -vector of zeros and 0N×K a N × k
matrix of zeros.
The set of hypotheses in 3.10 can now be reformulated in terms of the intercepts in the
regression as 
H0 : α = 0
H1 : α ̸= 0
.
The null hypothesis implies that the test assets expected returns can be obtained as a linear
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combination of the expected returns of the benchmark assets. Assuming that the excess returns
are i.i.d., the parameters of the multivariate model in 3.11 can be estimated using OLS for each
individual equation.
Gibbons et al. (1989) showed that the null hypothesis H0 can be verified via the following
test statistic:
ξGRS1 =
T −K −N
N
(
1 + µ̂′0Σ̂−100 µ̂0
)−1
α̂′Σ̂−1ϵ α̂, (3.12)
where Σ̂ϵ is the consistent estimator of Σϵ given by
Σ̂ϵ =
1
T
T∑
t=1
ϵ̂tϵ̂t
′.
Under H0 and the additional assumption that the excess returns are jointly normally dis-
tributed, the test statistic in 3.12 has exact distribution FN,T−K−N .
If excess returns are i.i.d. but not normal,H0 can be verified using an asymptotic test statistic
given by
ξGRS2 = T
(
1 + µ′0Σ−100 µ0
)−1
α̂′Σ−1ϵ α̂, (3.13)
which, under H0, is asymptotically distributed as χ2N . In order to compute ξGRS2 the unknown
quantities µ0, Σ00 and Σϵ can be replaced by their estimators R0, Σ̂00 and Σ̂ϵ.
Gibbons et al. (1989) also showed that the test statistics in 3.12 and 3.13 can be interpreted
in terms of Sharpe ratios:
ξGRS1 =
T −K −N
N
Ŝh
2 − Ŝh20
1 + Ŝh20
(3.14)
and
ξGRS2 = T
Ŝh
2 − Ŝh20
1 + Ŝh20
. (3.15)
Using equation 3.5, the difference of the squared Sharpe ratios can be written as
Ŝh
2 − Ŝh20 = µ̂′Σ̂−1µ̂− µ̂′0Σ̂−100 µ̂0
Exploiting the inverse partitioned formula for Σ̂−1, the last equation is equal to
Ŝh
2 − Ŝh20 = µ̂′0|1Σ̂−111|0µ̂0|1
where
µ̂0|1 = µ̂1 − Σ̂10Σ̂−100 µ̂0
Σ̂11|0 = Σ̂11 − Σ̂10Σ̂−100 Σ̂01.
(3.16)
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Since the values defined in 3.16 are also equal to the OLS estimates of α and Σϵ, respectively,
it is verified that
Ŝh
2 − Ŝh20 = α̂′Σ̂−1ϵ α̂.
It is interesting to highlight that, for a known value of the risk-free rate, the intersection test
procedures by Huberman and Kandel (1987) and De Roon and Nijman (2001) are equivalent to
the efficiency tests here described.
Short-Selling Restrictions
The efficiency test so far reviewed relies on the crucial assumption consisting in the absence
of short-selling restrictions. To overcome this limitation, De Roon et al. (2001) implemented
a variation of the intersection (and spanning) test that can be applied also in the presence of
two types of market frictions: short-selling restrictions and transaction costs. In particular, their
procedure involves testing for inequality constraints on the parameters of a regression equivalent
to the one defined in 3.113.
Alternatively, Glen and Jorion (1993) proposed an approach that exploits the already men-
tioned possibility of formulating the efficiency hypothesis test statistics in terms of Sharpe ratios.
When short selling is not allowed, the distributions of the statistics in 3.14 and 3.15 are unknown
but can be approximated through simulation. This methodology can be described as follows:
1. Expected excess returns and covariance matrix of the test and benchmark assets are com-
puted from observed data.
2. Excess returns of the N test assets are modified in order to satisfy the null hypothesis
implying the efficiency of the subset ofK assets. This is achieved by first computing the
MS portfolio of the K assets imposing positivity constraints. Then, the returns of the N
test assets are regressed against the returns of theMS portfolio just computed:
Ri,t = αi + βMS,iRMS,t + ϵi i = 1, . . . , N.
According to Glen and Jorion (1993), the null hypothesis implies that αi = 0 ∀ i =
1, . . . , N .4 Therefore, null-restricted excess returns for the test assets can be computed as
follows:
R0i,t = β̂MS,iRMS,t + ϵ̂i i = 1, . . . , N.
3With the difference that returns, and not excess returns, are used.
4De Roon et al. (2001) proved that, in case of short-selling restrictions, the null hypothesis is satisfied even
with αi ≤ 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , N .
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This ensures that the MS portfolio (with positivity constraints) of the N +K assets will
coincides with the one of theK benchmark assets, satisfying the null hypothesis.
3. A random sample of returns, of size T × (N +K), is drawn from a multivariate normal
distribution using as parameters those computed on the null-restricted data. Expected
returns and covariance matrix are then estimated from the simulated sample.
4. MS portfolios (with positivity constraint) are computed for theK assets and for theN+K
assets, using the parameters estimated in the previous step, and the test statistic in 3.15 is
recorded5.
5. Steps 3 and 4 are repeated a sufficiently large number of times.
6. Denoting by ξGRS2 the original test statistic (computed on observed data), the p-value can
be computed as
PV = {ξ
∗,m
GRS2 ≥ ξGRS2}+ 1
M + 1 ,
where ξ∗,mGRS2 is the test statistic computed from the m-th simulated sample and M is the
number of performed simulations.
Alternatively to what described in step 3, random samples can be generated via block boot-
strap. This involves resampling, with replacement, blocks of returns from the null-restricted data
obtained in step 2. In particular, either the stationary bootstrap or the circular block bootstrap
from Politis and Romano (1992, 1994) can be used. These methodologies have the advantage of
not relying on any assumption regarding the underlying distribution and also allows preserving
autocorrelation in stocks’ returns.
TheMATLAB code, implementing the twomean-variance efficiency tests (with and without
short-selling), is included in Appendix B.
3.4 Performance Testing with the Sharpe Ratio
The Sharpe ratio is widely used by analysts and investors to compare the performances of two
alternative investment strategies (such as stocks, portfolios, hedge funds, mutual funds etc.).
Even though it may not be the most adequate measure when dealing with non normally dis-
tributed returns (since it relies only on the first two moments of the returns’ distribution), Eling
5In this case, since their distribution is approximated through simulation, using test statistic 3.14 or 3.15 is
equivalent.
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and Schuhmacher (2007) showed that the Sharpe ratio can result in almost identical performance
ranking when compared to alternative measures6.
The Sharpe ratio computed from historical return data does represents an estimation and,
therefore, is affected by estimation error. Consequently, the comparison between two Sharpe
ratios, relative to two different investment strategies, must be based on statistical inference.
Jobson and Korkie (1981) proposed a test statistic that, under the assumption that returns are
i.i.d. and normally distributed, allows verifying the hypothesis that the difference between two
Sharpe ratios is equal to zero.
More recently, Ledoit and Wolf (2008) developed two inference methods that are valid in
more general conditions: returns’ distribution with heavier tail than the normal and autocorrela-
tion. Starting from the difference of the estimated Sharpe ratios, the first test involves comput-
ing a HAC (Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) standard error, while the second,
which exhibits improved finite sample performance, involves building a studentized bootstrap
confidence interval.
This section will be dedicated at briefly describing these two methods using a notation as
faithful as possible to the original paper.
3.4.1 Framework
Suppose there are two investment strategies, i and n, whose excess returns7 at time t are rti and
rtn, respectively. T return pairs (r1i, r1n)′, . . . , (rTi, rTn)′ are observed.
The returns’ distribution has mean vector and covariance matrix given by
µ =
µi
µn
 , Σ =
σ2i σin
σin σ
2
n
 .
Sample means and sample variances are denoted by µ̂i, µ̂n and σ̂i, σ̂i.
The difference between the Sharpe ratios is given by
∆ = Shi − Shn = µi
σi
− µn
σn
6In particular, they tested 13 different performance measures: Sharpe’s, Treynor’s, and Jensen’s measures,
Omega and Sortino ratio, Kappa 3, the upside potential ratio, the Calmar ratio, the Sterling ratio, the Burke ratio,
the excess return on value at risk, the conditional Sharpe ratio, and the modified Sharpe ratio.
7To be consistent with what done so far, excess returns are computed over the risk-free rate. Alternatively they
can be computed over a given benchmark, such as a stock index, but in that case, as pointed ou in Ledoit and Wolf
(2008), the performance measure used is the Information ratio (rather than the Sharpe ratio).
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and its estimator is
∆̂ = Ŝhi − Ŝhn = µ̂i
σ̂i
− µ̂n
σ̂n
.
In implementing their methodology, the authors preferred dealing with uncentered second
moments, that is γi = E(r21i) and γn = E(r21n), with their sample counterparts γ̂i and γ̂n.
Defining v = (µi, µn, γi, γn)′ and v̂ = (µ̂i, µ̂n, γ̂i, γ̂n)′, ∆ and ∆̂ can be rewritten as
∆ = f(v), ∆̂ = f(v̂),
where
f(a, b, c, d) = a√
c− a2 −
b√
c− b2 . (3.17)
Assuming that
√
T (v̂ − v) d−→ N (0,Ψ),
where Ψ is an unknown symmetric positive semi-definite matrix, the delta method implies that
√
T (∆̂−∆) d−→ N (0,∇′f(v)Ψ∇f(v)), (3.18)
where
∇′f(a, b, c, d) =
(
c
(c− a2)1.5 ,−
d
(d− b2)1.5 ,−
1
2
a
(c− a2)1.5 ,
1
2
b
(d− b2)1.5
)
.
Given a consistent estimator Ψ̂ for Ψ, the standard error for ∆̂ can be computed as
s(∆̂) =
√
∇′f(v̂)Ψ̂∇f(v̂)
T
. (3.19)
3.4.2 HAC Inference
A consistent estimator Ψ̂ can be obtained by using HAC kernel estimation. Once chosen the
kernel function k(·) and a bandwith ST , the kernel estimate for Ψ is given by
Ψ̂ = T
T − 4
T−1∑
j=−T+1
k( j
ST
)Γ̂T (j),
where
Γ̂T (j) =

1
T
∑T
t=j+1 ŷtŷ
′
t−j for j ≥ 0
1
T
∑T
t=−j+1 ŷt+j ŷ
′
t for j < 0
, ŷ′t = (rti − µ̂i, rtn − µ̂n, r2ti − γ̂i, r2tn − γ̂n).
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In their application, Ledoit and Wolf (2008) used both a Parzen and a Quadratic-Spectral
(QS) kernel function8, while the bandwidth was computed using an automatic method described
by Andrews (1991).
Given the kernel estimator Ψ̂, the standard error s(∆̂) is given by equation 3.19. The asymp-
totic normality implied in 3.18 allows computing a two-sided p-value for the null hypothesis
H0 : ∆ = 0
PV = 2Φ
(
− |∆̂|
s(∆̂)
)
,
where Φ(·) is the cumulative density function (c.d.f.) of the normal distribution.
Alternatively, a 1− α confidence interval for ∆ is given by
∆̂± z1−a2 s(∆̂), (3.20)
where zλ is the λ quantile of the standard normal distribution.
3.4.3 Bootstrap Inference
The second approach involves constructing a two-sided bootstrap confidence interval for∆with
a nominal level of 1 − α. If the interval does not contain 0, the null hypothesis H0 : ∆ = 0 is
rejected with significance level equal to α.
More precisely, the authors proposed constructing a symmetric studentized bootstrap confi-
dence interval by approximating the distribution function of the studentized statistic as follows:
L
( |∆̂−∆|
s(∆̂)
)
≈ L
( |∆̂∗ − ∆̂|
s(∆̂∗)
)
,
where∆ is the unknown true difference between the Sharpe ratios, ∆̂ is the estimated difference
computed from observed data, s(∆̂) is the standard error for ∆, ∆̂∗ is is the estimated differ-
ence computed from bootstrap data, and s(∆̂∗) is the standard error for ∆̂∗. L(X) denotes the
distribution of the random variable X .
The bootstrap 1− α confidence interval for ∆ is computed as
∆̂± z∗|·|,1−αs(∆̂), (3.21)
where z∗|·|,1−α is the 1− α quantile of L
(
|∆̂∗ − ∆̂|/s(∆̂∗)
)
.
To generate bootstrap data, Ledoit and Wolf (2008) employed the circular block bootstrap
from Politis and Romano (1992). This involves resampling, with replacement, blocks of return
8In their simulation study the two kernel functions resulted in virtually identical rejection probabilities.
42 CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY
pairs from the observed (r1i, r1n)′, t = 1, . . . , T , where the block has a fixed size b ≥ 1.9
The standard error s(∆̂) is computed as in equation 3.19, estimatingΨ via kernel estimation,
while the bootstrap standard error for ∆̂∗ is given by
s(∆̂∗) =
√
∇′f(v̂∗)Ψ̂∗∇f(v̂∗)
T
,
where v̂∗ = (µ̂∗i , µ̂∗n, γ̂∗i , γ̂∗n) is the estimator of v from bootstrap data.
Additionally, defining l = ⌊T/b⌋, where ⌊·⌋ denotes the integer part, the equation used by
Ledoit and Wolf (2008) to compute Ψ̂∗ is as follows
Ψ̂∗ = 1
l
l∑
j=1
ζjζ
′
j,
with
ζj =
1√
b
b∑
t=1
y∗(j−1)b+t t = 1, . . . , l.
Crucial in the described bootstrap methodology is the choice of an appropriate block size
b. For this purpose, the authors chose to use a calibration method which, given a calibration
function g : b→ 1−λ and a desired confidence level 1−α, involves finding the value of b that
minimizes |g(b)− (1− α)|.10
Finally, a two-sided test for the null hypothesis H0 : ∆ = 0 at significance level α can be
performed by constructing a confidence interval with confidence level 1−α for∆ as in equation
3.21; if zero is not included in the interval then the null hypothesis is rejected. Alternatively, a
p-value can be obtained as
PV =
{
d˜∗,m ≥ d
}
+ 1
M + 1 ,
(3.22)
where d is the “original” studentized test statistic
d = |∆̂|
s(∆̂)
,
and d˜∗,m is the centred studentized statistic computed from the m-th bootstrap sample
d˜∗,m = |∆̂
∗,m − ∆̂|
s(∆̂∗,m)
m = 1, . . . ,M.
Ledoit and Wolf (2008) suggest settingM , the number of bootstrap resamples, equal to 4999.
9Ledoit and Wolf (2008) proposed two different bootstrap methodologies depending whether the observed
return data is i.i.d. or of time series nature. The authors recommend always using the methodology for time series
data, therefore the one for i.i.d. data will not be reviewed.
10For a detailed description of how to compute the optimal block size see algorithm 3.1 in the original paper.
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3.5 Performance Testing with the Variance
When following an investment strategy aimed at minimizing returns variance, like investing
in the GMV portfolio, it is more meaningful to compare alternative strategies’ performance by
analysing their variances, rather than their Sharpe ratios. Ledoit and Wolf (2011) showed that
the robust inference methods described in the previous section can also be used, after appropriate
modifications, to test for the difference in the variance of two investment strategies.
Since the methodology strongly resembles the one already reviewed, only the relevant dif-
ferences will be here reported.
3.5.1 Framework
Using the same notation as before, the hypotheses to test are now
H0 : ∆ = 0 vs. H1 : ∆ ̸= 0,
with
∆ = log(σ2i )− log(σ2n)
and its sample counterpart
∆̂ = log(σ̂2i )− log(σ̂2n).
The authors justify the use of the log-transformation of the variances stating that it conduces to
better finite-sample properties of the inference methods.
The function defined in 3.17 needs now to be modified in
f(a, b, c, d) = log(c− a2)− log(d− b2)
and its gradient becomes
∇′f(a, b, c, d) =
(
− 2a
c− a2 ,
2b
d− b2 ,
1
c− a2 ,−
1
d− b2
)
.
From this point forward, both the HAC and the bootstrap inference methods are exactly the
same as those used for testing the difference in Sharpe ratios.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Research
This chapter reviews all the procedures used to investigate the impact of SRI strategies on ef-
ficiency and portfolio performance. Starting by illustrating the process of data selection and
management, it then proceeds describing the application of the methodology seen in the previ-
ous chapter. Results are then displayed and discussed with the aid of plots and tables.
4.1 Data
4.1.1 Reference Index
The first step of this research consisted in choosing the market region to analyse. In order to
differentiate this thesis from existing studies (in particular Galema et al., 2009 and Herzel et al.,
2012), which mainly focused on the North American market, the effects of investing according
to socially responsible criteria were tested using data relative to European region.
The investment universe, from which select the companies to include in the portfolios, was
chosen to coincide with a broad European equity index, the STOXX Europe 600. This is a
capitalization-weighted index with a fixed number of 600 components including large, mid and
small capitalization companies from 17 countries of the European region1. The index is reviewed
on a quarterly basis and its constituents are updated at the end of March, June, September and
December.
Constituents lists of the index, from December 2001 to March 2016, were obtained from
Datastream and merged into a single list2. Multiple entries were then removed by controlling
1Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
2Datastream provides historical constituent lists for each month of the index life period. Since the STOXX
Europe 600 is reviewed quarterly, only the constituents lists relative to March, June, September and December of
each year were downloaded. The lists relative to these months are those already updated and valid for the three
subsequent months.
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both ISIN codes and Datastream identifiers. The result of this process was a “master” list con-
sisting of the 1151 different companies which, at some point in time, since 2002, have been
included in the STOXX Europe 600.
For each one of the 1151 companies the following data was downloaded from Datastream
(datatypes in parentheses): Industry (ICBIN)3, country of domiciliation (WC06026), daily Total
Return Index (RI)4 and Market Capitalization (MV) time series expressed in euro. Monthly
Returns were then computed on the Total Return Index value of the last trading day of each
month.
It is important here to clarify that the investment universe was not fixed and did not coincide
with all the 1151 companies. Instead, its composition varied, matching, each trimester, that of
the STOXX Europe 600.
4.1.2 ESG Ratings
In order to implement the SRI strategies, the next step consisted in obtaining ESG ratings for
the companies included in the investment universe.
Through Datastream, Thompson Reuters provides access to the Asset4 ESG database. As-
set4 is one of the most comprehensive ESG databases, providing, since 2003, yearly data for
more than 4000 companies worldwide.
The data is structured in 4 pillars representing the four areas of company performance: eco-
nomic, environment, social and corporate governance. More than 250 key performance indi-
cators, computed from 750 data points, covering every aspect of sustainability reporting, are
combined to provide an overall score for each one of the 4 pillars (see figure 4.1). For each
company, Asset4 computes the scores, ranging from 0% to 100%, by equally weighting and z-
scoring5 all the underlying data points and comparing them against all other companies in their
database. The resulting score represents, therefore, a relative measurement of performance.6
The social and environment performance pillars also includes data points indicating whether a
company generates revenue from controversial business activities and products7.
3Using the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) taxonomy.
4The Total Return Index, opposed to price value, takes also into account dividends, assuming that these are
always reinvested.
5Starting from a raw value, a z-score, or standard score, is computed by subtracting the population mean value
and dividing the result by the population standard deviation. This allows to more easily distinguish between values
that, otherwise, would be very close to each other
6The scores calculation methodology is described in an Excel file retrievable at the following link: https://
uvalibraryfeb.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/asset4_esg_data_glossary_april2013.xlsx (ac-
cessed on March 22, 2016).
7These include: alcohol, gambling, tobacco, armaments, pornography, contraceptives, abortifacients, embry-
onic stem cell research, cluster bombs, anti-personal landmines, agrochemicals, animal testing, nuclear energy
production, genetically modified organisms.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the Asset4 data framework showing how the data points and key performance
indicators are structured into the four pillars. Image source: Thompson Reuters.
This research involved downloading the scores representing environment (ENV), social
(SOC) and corporate governance (GOV) performance, starting from fiscal year 2002 up to 2015,
for each one of the 1151 companies (when available). By equally-weighting the three distinct
scores, an average ESG score was then computed. The economic performance score, concerning
aspects not relevant for an ESG analysis, was not considered. Additionally, data points indicat-
ing company involvement in “sin” activities were also downloaded8. Following the approach
used by STOXX Ltd. for their ESG and Sustainability indices9, the controversial activities con-
sidered as “sin” were: production of alcoholic beverages, gambling activities, production of
tobacco, production of vehicles, planes, armaments, or any combat materials used by the mili-
tary and production or distribution of pornography.
4.1.3 Rating Matching and Yearly Coverage Ratio
Obtained the ESG data, it was necessary to match, for each trimester, the companies included
in the investment universe with their ratings, valid for that particular year. Since Asset4 does
not seem to release the data for all the companies in their database at the same time10, it was
necessary to assume that the ratings, relative to a particular fiscal year, were released at the end
8These data points, merely consisting in a Yes or No, indicate whether part of a company’s revenue come from
a particular controversial activity.
9In particular the STOXX Europe Sustainability Index ex AGTAFA (alcohol, gambling, tobacco, armaments,
firearms and adult entertainment), see https://www.stoxx.com/index-details?symbol=SUYP.
10As of May 2016 almost only half of the companies rated for fiscal year 2014 had ratings available (at least on
Datastream) relative to 2015.
48 CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Jun
-03
De
c-0
3
Jun
-04
De
c-0
4
Jun
-05
De
c-0
5
Jun
-06
De
c-0
6
Jun
-07
De
c-0
7
Jun
-08
De
c-0
8
Jun
-09
De
c-0
9
Jun
-10
De
c-1
0
Jun
-11
De
c-1
1
Jun
-12
De
c-1
2
Jun
-13
De
c-1
3
Jun
-14
De
c-1
4
Jun
-15
De
c-1
5
Date
50
60
70
80
90
100
R
at
io
 (%
)
Figure 4.2: Percentage of companies included in the STOXX Europe 600 for which Asset4 provided
ESG data.
of June of the subsequent year. Following this logic, the constituent lists of March of each year
were matched with the ratings relative to two years prior, while those of June, September and
December with those of one year prior. For example, an investor, willing to implement an SRI
strategy at the end of March 2016, would have been bound to use ratings relative to the year
2014, given that no data would have been available for 2015. Asset4 provides ESG data starting
from fiscal year 2002, therefore, the first constituent list with matching ratings was that of June
2003.
Completed thematching process, it was possible to compute, for each trimester (starting from
June 2003 up to March 2016), a rating coverage ratio expressing the percentage of companies,
constituents of the STOXX Europe 600, covered by Asset4. As shown in figure 4.2, the first
two years were characterized by a coverage ratio of around 60% meaning that, out of the 600
companies included in the index, about 240 were not rated by Asset4. Starting from June 2005
the coverage ratio rose to almost 80% and since June 2006 it never fell below 94%.
In the paper from Herzel et al. (2012), the authors decided to exclude from the analysed
investment universe all those companies with no available ESG data, applying the screening
processes only on companies covered by KLD’s ratings. In this analysis, instead, the exclusion
of non rated assets was considered to be part of the screening process. This meant that, especially
for the first three years, the effects of implementing an SRI strategy were also determined by the
scarcity of ESG data. The intention was to replicate a more realistic scenario in which socially
responsible investors are also faced with the difficulties of obtaining data for companies in their
investment universe. This may have been true, in particular, in less recent years, when the SRI
phenomenon was not as popular as today and the demand for ESG rating services was not as
strong.
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4.2 SRI Strategies Implementation
4.2.1 Preliminary Restriction on the Investment Universe
Before implementing any kind of SRI strategy, a necessary restriction was applied to the invest-
ment universe. In order to have, each trimester, sufficient historical data to perform the required
estimations (expected returns and covariance matrix), companies with less than 5 years of past
returns data were excluded. As a result, the actual investment universe, used in this empirical
research, did not perfectly coincide with the STOXX Europe 600 index. Instead, it included a
smaller and not fixed number of companies.
4.2.2 Screening Strategies
The typology of ESG ratings provided by Asset4 allowed to implement a combination of two
SRI strategies: a negative, or ethical, screening strategy, consisting in excluding companies
involved in “sin” activities, and a positive screening strategy, consisting in selecting only the
best performing companies in environment, social and corporate governance aspects.
For the positive screening strategy, a Best-in-Universe approach was adopted. This consists
in selecting the best performing companies over the entire investment universe, as opposed to
a Best-in-Class approach in which the selection process is applied industry by industry. The
Asset4 rating methodology makes this kind of approach feasible; as already seen, companies’
ESG performances are evaluated in such a way that the resulting scores are also comparable
across different industires.
Starting from June 2003, and for each trimester up to March 2016, the SRI strategies were
implemented in the following order:
1. Exclusion of companies not rated by Asset4 (negative screening).
2. Exclusion of rated companies involved in “sin”activities (negative screening).
3. Selection of a predetermined percentage of best performing companies (among those not
already excluded) based on the average ESG score11 (positive screening).
As in Herzel et al. (2012), to study the impact of different degrees of social responsibility, three
distinct percentages were used for the positive screening process: 90%, 70% and 50%.12
Additionally, in order to compare the impact on portfolio performance of the three different
aspects of social responsibility, the environment, social and corporate governance scores were
11From this point forward the average ESG score will simply be referred to as ESG score.
12For example, with the 90% positive screening the worst 10% is excluded.
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also separately taken into account. In this case, the SRI strategy consisted in applying only the
positive screening process based on the four types of score: ESG, ENV, SOC, GOV.
Throughout most of this chapter, the analysis focuses on the combined negative and positive
screening strategies based on ESG score, for which all results are displayed. The results for the
remaining SRI strategies are reported in the last section.
4.2.3 Descriptive Analysis
The implementation of a SRI strategy inevitably affects the composition of the investment uni-
verse, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. By taking as reference the investment universe
of a traditional investor (in this case, companies included in the STOXX Europe 600 and with
at least five years of returns data), it is possible to investigate the effect of implementing a SRI
strategy by examining three characteristics:
1. Actual number of companies included in the investment universe.
2. Industry composition.
3. Total market capitalization.
The plot in figure 4.3 shows, for each trimester, the number of companies remaining after
applying the different levels of screening. Consistent with what already seen in figure 4.2 for
the rating coverage ratio, up until June 2006, excluding companies with no ESG rating meant
reducing the investment universe of a considerable number of components. In the first two
years, almost 200 companies were lacking rating fromAsset4 and almost 100 the following year.
Instead, since June 2006 nearly all companies included in the reference investment universe were
covered. Companies involved in “sin” activities represented a significant and slightly growing
fraction of the rated ones, starting from 7% in 2003 up to around 11% in recent years. By looking
at the plot, it is reasonable to expect that the effects of implementing a SRI strategy in terms of
optimal portfolio performance, if any, would be particularly strong in the first three years, due
to the large number of assets excluded because of scarcity of ESG data.
Implementing a Best-in-Universe strategy means that the screened investment universe may
differ from the reference one in terms of industries composition. This can impact SRI portfolios
performances because of the different degree of exposure to industry specific risks compared to
a conventional portfolio. Figure 4.4 shows how the composition, in terms of industries, changed
after applying the different levels of screening in the last trimester of the sample (March 2016).
Both from the bar plot and the actual percentages reported in table 4.1 it appears that the com-
position did not drastically change, at least up to the 70% screening level.
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Figure 4.3: Number of companies for the different levels of screening.
It may seem odd, however, that the Oil & and Gas industry, commonly associated with
practices and products that have a negative impact on the environment (e.g. fracking, CO2
emissions, oil spills etc.), was progressively more represented as the level of SRI screening
increased. Moreover, this was not an isolated case since both in June 2003 and December 2009
(figures and tables included in Appendix C), start and midpoint of the analysed time frame, the
percentage of companies belonging to this sector increased after the screening processes.
This type of result can be explained by the following arguments:
1. The Oil & Gas industry, according to the ICB taxonomy, contains three sectors: 1.oil &
gas producers, 2.oil equipment, services & distribution and 3.alternative energy. Com-
panies belonging to the alternative energy sector, which are expected to have high ENV
score, may be able to compensate for the possible bad performance of the other two and
positively affect the overall industry score. In March 2016 the average ENV score of
the 18 companies belonging to the oil & gas industry, excluding the alternative energy
sector, was 74%, almost coinciding with that of the reference investment universe. Two
companies belonged to the alternative energy sector (in particular to the renewable energy
equipment subsector) with an average ENV score of 94%.
2. The ESG score is obtained by equally weighting the ENV, SOC and GOV ones. Oil &
Gas industry companies may have simply performed above average on the Social and
Corporate Governance aspects. This was the case in March 2016.
3. TheAssets4methodology, with regard to environment performance, consists in evaluating
companies in terms of emission reduction, product innovation and resource reduction.
Besides actual achievements in these fields, effort and commitment is also rewarded. This
evaluation method may allow Oil & Gas companies to be assigned a relatively high ENV
score.
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Figure 4.4: Number of companies per industry for the different levels of screening (as of March 2016).
Lastly, it was possible to investigate how the exclusion of non-SR companies translated in
terms of total market capitalization loss. Figure 4.5 shows the loss, in percentage terms, with
respect to the unrestricted investment universe. As expected, in the first three years, losses were
strongly affected by the exclusion of a large number of non rated companies. In the subsequent
years, even after eliminating more than half of the companies with the 50% screening (see figure
4.3), losses never exceeded the 40% level. This could mean that, on average, larger companies
tend to perform better (in ESG terms) than smaller ones and that SR investors will prefer to
invest in large and mid capitalization stocks.
Table 4.1: Industry composition for the different levels of screening (as of March 2016).
Industry Composition
Industry Reference Rated ”Sin” Excl. Best 90% Best 70% Best 50%
Financials 23.4% 23.6% 25.7% 24.3% 21.8% 22.5%
Industrial 21.3% 21.2% 19.9% 21.0% 21.2% 19.7%
Consumer Services 13.6% 13.4% 12.0% 11.8% 11.2% 11.2%
Consumer Goods 12.3% 12.3% 10.4% 10.7% 11.5% 11.2%
Basic Materials 7.1% 7.2% 8.0% 8.5% 9.7% 11.6%
Health Care 6.8% 6.7% 7.4% 6.9% 6.6% 4.4%
Utilities 4.6% 4.7% 5.2% 5.8% 6.9% 6.8%
Technology 3.9% 4.0% 4.2% 3.6% 3.2% 3.6%
Oil & Gas 3.6% 3.4% 3.8% 4.0% 4.9% 5.2%
Telecommunications 3.4% 3.4% 3.2% 3.3% 3.2% 3.6%
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Figure 4.5: Market capitalization loss due to the implementation of the different levels of screening.
4.3 Testing SRI Portfolios Performance
So far, the effects of implementing a SRI strategy have been analysed only in terms of the
investment universe composition. One of the main purposes of this research, though, was to
verify whether the exclusion of non-SR assets determined a significant loss in terms of efficiency
and performance.
Given a set of risky asset and assuming the existence of a risk-free rate, themaximum achiev-
able performance can be measured, ex-ante, by estimating the Sharpe ratio of the tangency port-
folio. This value can be computed as seen in section 3.1, having previously estimated the assets
expected returns and covariance matrix.
Figures 4.6a and 4.6b show the loss, in terms of maximum achievable Sharpe ratio, for the
negative13 and the three different levels of positive screening strategies based on the ESG score,
with and without short-selling, respectively. For this purpose, expected returns and covariance
matrix were estimated on a rolling basis, starting from June 2003 up to March 2016, using, each
trimester, the last five years of monthly returns data. As for the risk-free rate, the U.S. one month
t-bill rate was used.
Expected returns were estimated using sample means (as in equation 3.7, p. 31), while
the covariance matrix, due to the large number of assets included in the reference investment
universe, needed to be estimated employing a factor model as described in section 3.2.2. The
chosen risk factors were the three from Fama and French (excess market return, Small Minus
Big and High Minus Low) and Carhart’s Momentum, all relative to the European region.14
13From this point forward, the negative screening strategy is characterized by the exclusion of both non rated
and “sin” companies.
14The time series relative to the risk factors and of the U.S. one month t-bill rate were downloaded from K.R.
French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
The factors returns available from the website are in U.S. dollars so, prior to be employed in the factor model
estimation, they were converted in EUR using monthly exchange rates time series from Banca d’Italia database.
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Figure 4.6: Sharpe ratio loss, relative to the tangency portfolios, due to the implementation of the differ-
ent levels of screening, with and without short-selling restrictions.
In accordance with MV theory, losses in terms of Sharpe ratio increased with the level of
screening; assets exclusion determined a reduction in mean-variance opportunities. This effect
was considerably smaller when imposing short-selling restriction and, for both the unrestricted
and restricted cases, during the period from June 2008 to June 2013.
While the two plots show the performance loss an SRI investor would have expected to
experience (ex-ante), investing in a particular point in time, they do not tell whether that loss
was statistically significant or merely due to estimation error. This type of information can be
obtained by implementing the efficiency test seen in section 3.3.1.
Risk Factors Exposure Comparison
The betas obtained from the four factor model implementation, employed for estimating the
covariance matrices, also allowed verifying whether SR and non-SR companies exhibited dif-
ferences in terms of risk factors exposure.15
15For this type of analysis, the two asset classes were determined by applying up to the 70% screening strategy
based on ESG score.
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Figure 4.7: Risk factors exposure comparison between SR (blue) and non-SR (red) companies at three
different points in time.
The box-plots16 in figure 4.7 allow performing a visual comparison between the factor load-
ing distributions, relative to the two asset classes, for the four risk factors at three different
points in time: June 2003, December 2009 and March 2016. While no major differences are
visible for any of the four risk factors, it seems that, overall, SR companies tend to exhibit a
smaller exposure to the Small Minus Big factor compared to non-SR companies; boxes’ edges
(first and third quartiles) and medians are shifted downwards in all three analysed time frames.
This result, although not characterized by statistical significance, is related to what already seen
when analysing the effects of the screening processes in terms of market capitalisation: excluded
companies were, on average, smaller than the remaining SR ones.
16On each box, the central mark indicates themedian, while the bottom and top edges of the box indicate the 25th
and 75th percentiles, respectively. The whiskers extend to the most extreme data points not considered outliers,
and the outliers are plotted individually using the ’+’ symbol.
56 CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Table 4.2: Assets grouping scheme.
Assets Grouping
Portfolio N° Assets Included
1 Non rated companies
2 Companies involved in sin activities
3 Companies with ESG score in first decile (worst 10%)
4 Companies with ESG score in second decile
5 Companies with ESG score in third decile
6 Companies with ESG score in fourth decile
7 Companies with ESG score in fifth decile
8 Companies with ESG score in sixth decile
9 Companies with ESG score in seventh decile
10 Companies with ESG score in eighth decile
11 Companies with ESG score in ninth decile
12 Companies with ESG score in last decile (best 10%)
4.3.1 Testing Efficiency
A major problem encountered in applying the efficiency test to this particular setup was related
to the large number of assets involved; in order to estimate the regression parameters in equation
3.11 (p. 35) it is required that the total number of assets is lower than the number of observations
or, using the usual notation, N +K < T , whereK and N are the umber of benchmark and test
assets, respectively.
In this case, the test assets should have coincided with the excluded companies (according to
the different screening levels), while the benchmark assets with the remaining ones. As already
shown in figure 4.3, the total number of assets (N +K) almost never fell below 500, way above
60, the number of historical monthly returns taken into account (T ).
The only viable solution was to reduce dimensionality by grouping assets in a reasonable
number of equally-weighted portfolios17. The criterion used to create the different portfolios
consisted in sorting the assets depending on their SR “status”, as described in table 4.2.18
Each of the 4 different levels of screening corresponded to the exclusion of a specific number
of portfolios:
1. Negative screening: portfolios n° 1 and 2.
2. Neg. scr. + selection of best 90%: portfolios n° 1,2 and 3.
3. Neg. scr. + selection of best 70%: portfolios n° 1,2,3,4 and 5.
17As a robustness check, the test was also performed using value-weighted portfolios.
18This process was repeated for the other strategies, consisting in the positive screening only, and different
score type (ESG, ENV, SOC, GOV). In those cases the number of portfolios was 11 since the distinction in “sin”
companies was not needed.
4.3. TESTING SRI PORTFOLIOS PERFORMANCE 57
Jun
-03
De
c-0
3
Jun
-04
De
c-0
4
Jun
-05
De
c-0
5
Jun
-06
De
c-0
6
Jun
-07
De
c-0
7
Jun
-08
De
c-0
8
Jun
-09
De
c-0
9
Jun
-10
De
c-1
0
Jun
-11
De
c-1
1
Jun
-12
De
c-1
2
Jun
-13
De
c-1
3
Jun
-14
De
c-1
4
Jun
-15
De
c-1
5
Date
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Te
st
 S
ta
tis
tic
Value
C.V. 90%
C.V. 95%
C.V. 99%
(a) Negative screening
Jun
-03
De
c-0
3
Jun
-04
De
c-0
4
Jun
-05
De
c-0
5
Jun
-06
De
c-0
6
Jun
-07
De
c-0
7
Jun
-08
De
c-0
8
Jun
-09
De
c-0
9
Jun
-10
De
c-1
0
Jun
-11
De
c-1
1
Jun
-12
De
c-1
2
Jun
-13
De
c-1
3
Jun
-14
De
c-1
4
Jun
-15
De
c-1
5
Date
0
5
10
15
20
25
Te
st
 S
ta
tis
tic
(b) Best 90% selection (ESG)
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(d) Best 50% selection (ESG)
Figure 4.8: Results of the efficiency test for the four different levels of screening. When the test value
lies above the critical value the null hypothesis is rejected.
4. Neg. scr. + selection of best 50%: portfolios n° 1,2,3,4,5,6 and 7.
The test was then performed on a quarterly rolling basis, starting from June 2003 up toMarch
2016, using, for each point in time, the last five years of monthly excess returns.
Figure 4.8 shows, for the four levels of screening, the test statistic and the critical values
corresponding to three different significance levels (10%, 5% and 1%).19 As expected, the
frequency of rejection of the null hypothesis, consisting in the efficiency of the subset of SR
assets, increased with the level of screening. For the negative screening only, the efficiency
hypothesis was rejected, with a significance level of 5%, 11 times out of 52, mostly concentrated
at the beginning and at the end of the sample. For the highest degree of screening, instead,
rejection cases rose to 36 out of 52. During the period from September 2008 up to June 2014,
the exclusion of non-SR assets affected efficiency to a noticeable lesser degree than in the rest
of the time frame, for all screening levels.
19Portfolio returns were assumed to be i.i.d. but non-normally distributed, therefore, the test usedwas the asymp-
totically valid one (equation 3.13, p. 36) and critical values were computed as the 90th, 95th and 99th percentiles of
a chi-square distribution with N degrees of freedom.
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Figure 4.9: Results of the efficiency test in the case of short-selling restrictions. Critical values are not
constant since the test statistic distribution is approximated via simulation.
Next, it was important to verify the effects of short-selling restrictions, imposed both on test
(non-SR) and benchmark assets (SR). Figure 4.9 shows the test results obtained by applying the
simulation based test procedure described in section 3.3.120 to the same strategies analysed for
the unrestricted case. For all levels of screening, the frequency of rejection of the null hypothesis
was greatly reduced compared to the unrestricted case; negative screening alone almost never
determined a significant efficiency loss. Again, rejection cases were concentrated in specific
time periods: from the beginning of 2006 up to June 2008 and from September 2014 up toMarch
2016. Short-selling restrictions had a great impact especially during the period from June 2003
up to March 2005; while for the unrestricted case those two years were characterised by the
inefficiency of SRI portfolios, this was not true any more when imposing positivity constraints.
It is interesting to highlight that, based on these results, the years between December 2008
and June 2014 represented a favourable period for SR investors; investing in low rated compa-
nies did not offer additional mean-variance opportunities. Given the time frame, it is not too
20Simulations were performed using the stationary bootstrap procedure with average block size = 3 and 2000
resamples
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far-fetched to assume that both the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt cri-
sis may have contributed in determining the necessary conditions for this to occur and that the
effects may have lasted for several years.21This result can also help explain what Becchetti et
al. (2015) observed in their research. As already mentioned in chapter 2, they found that, in the
years following the global financial crisis, SRI funds outperformed conventional ones.
As a robustness check, efficiency tests, for all levels of screening and for both the restricted
and unrestricted case, were also performed on value-weighted portfolios22. These tests yielded
results (included in Appendix A) consistent with those obtained with equally-weighted portfo-
lios and, therefore, lead to the same considerations.
4.3.2 Dynamic Allocation Strategies and Out-of-Sample Performance
Sharpe-Ratio Comparison
The analyses described so far were based on the in-sample performance of screened and non-
screened optimal portfolios, computed using historical returns. This research would not have
been complete without also comparing the out-of-sample performance (relative to realized re-
turns) of these portfolios.
In particular, the process involved simulating, for all levels of screening, a dynamic alloca-
tion strategy with quarterly portfolio rebalancing. This consisted in repeating, for each trimester
(from June to 2003 up to December 2015), the following steps:
1. Estimation of the Maximum Sharpe portfolio, with and without short-selling restrictions.
The parameters of the optimization problems, expected returns and covariance matrix,
were estimated, as always, using the last five years of monthly returns. Expected returns
were estimated by the sample means while the covariance matrix was obtained by em-
ploying the four-factor model.
2. Computation of both daily and monthly realized returns, relative to the subsequent three
months, for the Maximum Sharpe portfolio estimated in the previous step.
Comparisons were then performed computing the difference in Sharpe ratios between non-SRI
and SRI portfolios (for all screening levels) and testing its significance using the methodologies
from Ledoit and Wolf (2008), described in section 3.4.
21Recall that the test was performed on a rolling basis, using, each time, 5 years of historical returns. This means
that on September 2014 test results were still affected by returns dating back to 2009.
22Efficiency tests using value-weighted portfolios were performed starting from June 2006 because of a lack of
market capitalisation data prior to 2001.
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Figure 4.10: Results of the Sharpe ratio test performed, each trimester, on the last threemonths of realized
daily returns. A negative value means that the screened portfolio outperformed the non-screened one.
Figure 4.10 shows the evolution, through time, of the difference in terms of Sharpe ratio,
for the four levels of screening, computed on realized daily returns. For each point in time, the
difference is relative to the previous 3 months of returns and the 95% confidence interval was
obtained as in equation 3.20 (p. 41), using the HAC inference method. If the confidence interval
contains zero, then the difference is not statistically significant.
In all four plots it is visible that the differences mostly hovered around the zero value, not
showing a clear dominance of one strategy over the other, and almost never being statistically
significant (at the 5% level). Only during the first two years, the non-screened portfolio occa-
sionally outperformed the screened ones with significant gains in terms of Sharpe ratio. It is
safe to assume that this result is related to the loss of mean-variance opportunities determined
by the exclusion of a large number of non rated assets. Results for portfolios with short-selling
restrictions are displayed in figure 4.11. No major differences with respect to the unrestricted
case are observable.
Realized monthly returns were then employed to compare the performance of non-screened
and screened portfolios over the entire time frame, from July 2003 up to March 2016. The sta-
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Figure 4.11: Results of the Sharpe ratio test performed on portfolios built imposing short-selling restric-
tions.
tistical tests, in this case, were performed adopting the bootstrap inference method described in
section 3.4.3, which, compared to the HAC methodology, should lead to more robust results.
The observed differences in Sharpe ratios, with the relative p-values, obtained as in equation
3.22 (p. 42), are displayed in table 4.3. Consistent with previous results, almost no screened
portfolios performed significantly different from the non-screened one. The only exception
Table 4.3: Results of the Sharpe ratio test performed on realized monthly returns relative to the entire
period (June 2003-March 2016).
Sharpe Ratio Test
Short-Selling No Short-Selling
Screening Level ∆ Sharpe ratio p-value ∆ Sharpe ratio p-value
Negative screening −0.027** 0.041 0.016 0.171
Best 90% (ESG) 0.035 0.313 −0.025 0.552
Best 90% (ESG) 0.004 0.881 −0.047 0.349
Best 90% (ESG) 0.002 0.963 −0.075 0.193
Notes: A negative value means that the screened portfolio outperformed the non-screened one.
*Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
**Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
***Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
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Figure 4.12: Results of the Sharpe ratio test performed on portfolios built employing equilibrium returns.
regarded the portfolio obtained by the exclusion of non rated and “sin” companies which per-
formed significantly better at the 5% level.
It is known, however, that the mean-variance optimization process is strongly affected by es-
timation error. Michaud (1989) defined it as an “estimation-error maximizers” that significantly
overweights (underweights) securities that have large (small) estimated returns, negative (pos-
itive) correlations and small (large) variance and that, especially when not imposing any form
of constraints, may lead to extreme and unfeasible asset weights. Additionally, mean-variance
optimizations are highly unstable; small changes in the inputs often translate into large changes
in the solutions. Combined, these flaws may lead to allocations which are not truly optimal and,
consequently, to poor out-of-sample performance. In some cases, optimal portfolios can be out-
performed by more naive allocation approaches, such as equally-weighting (Jobson & Korkie,
1980). Michaud (1989) also noted that one of the major contributors to the error-maximizing
character of MV optimization is the usage of sample means (computed on historical data) as
estimators of expected returns.
It is possible, then, that the results seen so far could have been distorted by the overall poor
out-of-sample performance of the estimated optimal portfolios, especially in the unrestricted
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Figure 4.13: Results of the Sharpe ratio test performed on portfolios built employing equilibrium returns
and imposing short-selling restrictions.
case (when allowing for negative positions). As a form of robustness check, sample means were
then replaced, in the mean-variance optimization process, by equilibrium returns, computed as
described in section 3.2.2 employing the usual four-factor model. These, generally, should lead
to more stable and less extreme allocations.
Tests were performed as above and results for the unrestricted and restricted cases are dis-
Table 4.4: Results of the Sharpe ratio test performed on realized monthly returns (portfolios built em-
ploying eq. returns) relative to the entire period (June 2003-March 2016).
Sharpe Ratio Test
Short-Selling No Short-Selling
Screening Level ∆ Sharpe ratio p-value ∆ Sharpe ratio p-value
Negative screening −0.004 0.913 0.017 0.222
Best 90% (ESG) −0.045 0.590 −0.009 0.766
Best 70% (ESG) −0.024 0.803 0.011 0.766
Best 50% (ESG) 0.043 0.636 0.045 0.314
Notes: A negative value means that the screened portfolio outperformed the non-screened one.
*Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
**Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
***Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
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played in figure 4.12 and 4.13, respectively.
Again, there was not a clear dominance of one strategy over the other. Non-screened port-
folio occasionally performed significantly better during the first two years and, differently from
previous results, also towards the end of the sample (for some screening level).
Table 4.4 shows results relative to the entire time period obtained using monthly returns and
the bootstrap inference methodology. No significant differences in performance are observable
between non-screened and screened portfolios.
Overall, it looks like the exclusion of non-SR assets, at all screening levels, does not deter-
mine a significant realized performance loss.
Variance Comparison
An additional test consisted in verifying whether the loss of diversification opportunities, due
to the exclusion of non-SR assets, determined a significant increase in portfolio risk, measured
by its realized variance.
The procedure strongly resembled the one used for the Sharpe ratio comparison, with the
main difference being that the target of the allocation strategies was the Global Minimum Vari-
ance portfolio, rather than the Maximum Sharpe. Differences in variance were then tested using
the methodology from Ledoit and Wolf (2011), described in section 3.5.
Figure 4.14 contains the four plots showing the difference in performance between non-
screened and screened portfolios, without short-selling restrictions. Tests were computed, like
for the Sharpe ratio, each trimester, using the last three months of realized daily returns. The
95% confidence interval was obtained using the HAC inference method.
Besides statistical significance, it was also important being able to assign an economic signif-
icance to the performance differential. Log-variance, in this regard, is not the most appropriate
dimension to use since it is not commonly employed as a risk measure and it is, therefore, diffi-
cult to interpret. Consequently, in the lower portion of each plot, the difference is also displayed
in terms of annualized volatility, making the analysis more straightforward.
Results show that, besides for the first level of screening, the exclusion of non-SR assets
almost always determined a significant increase in volatility, with the effect being stronger as the
number of excluded assets increased. Other than the first two years, where results were strongly
influenced by the exclusion of a large number of non rated companies, the most affected period
was from mid 2007 up to the end of 2010 (coinciding with the global financial crisis) with a
difference in annualized volatility reaching up to 8% for the highest level of screening.
When introducing short-selling restrictions, as shown in figure 4.15, the increase in volatility
seems to have followed the same trend as for the unrestricted case but, overall, the effect was
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Figure 4.14: Results of the variance test performed on the last three months of realized daily returns. A
negative value means that the non-screened portfolio outperformed the screened one. In the lower portion
of each plot the difference is displayed in terms of annualized volatility.
stronger.
Like for the Sharpe ratio, the differences in returns’ variance was also tested over the entire
period and computed on monthly returns. The results, displayed in table 4.5, confirm what
seen so far; exception made for the exclusion of non rated and “sin” companies, both with and
Table 4.5: Results of the variance test performed on realized monthly returns relative to the entire period
(June 2003-March 2016).
Variance Test
Short-Selling No Short-Selling
Screening Level ∆ Log-variance p-value ∆ Log-variance p-value
Negative screening −0.011 0.733 −0.068* 0.079
Best 90% (ESG) −0.123*** 0.007 −0.197** 0.028
Best 70% (ESG) −0.180*** 0.005 −0.315*** 0.007
Best 50% (ESG) −0.223** 0.018 −0.340*** 0.008
Notes: A negative value means that the non-screened portfolio outperformed the screened one.
*Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
**Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
***Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
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Figure 4.15: Results of the variance test performed on portfolios built imposing short-selling restrictions.
without short-selling restrictions, all the screened portfolios performed significantly worse than
the non-screened one at the 5% level or lower.
These results state that mean-variance investors, following a variance-minimizing strategy,
are better off by not applying any form of SRI screening (possibly with the exception of negative
screening only), especially during high volatility periods. It is up to investors decide whether
the gains in terms of ESG performance are sufficient to offset the negative effects (increase in
realized variance) of the screening strategies.
4.4 Environment, Social and Governance Screening
The last part of this research was aimed at verifying whether the three different dimensions of
social responsibility—environment, social and corporate governance—have a different impact
on efficiency and portfolio performance.
As already mentioned, the methodology involved implementing only the positive screen-
ing strategy for each one of the four types of score (ENV,SOC,GOV and ESG) and with the
usual three different levels of screening (90%, 70% and 50%). Not implementing the negative
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Figure 4.16: Results of the efficiency test for the highest level of screening (Best 50%) based on the
four distinct scores (ESG,ENV,SOC,GOV). When the test value lies above the critical value the null
hypothesis is rejected.
screening meant that companies were not excluded based on their involvement in controver-
sial activities but exclusively on their rating. The purpose was to better isolate the effects of
investing following a specific ESG thematic.
4.4.1 Testing Efficiency
Results of the efficiency tests for the highest level of screening (best 50%), with and without
allowing for short-selling, are shown in figures 4.16 and 4.17, respectively23.
The four strategies, overall, lead to comparable results: cases of rejection of the null hypoth-
esis (at the 5% level) were concentrated at the beginning and the end of the sample, while the
period fromDecember 2008 up to the second half of 2013 was characterized by more favourable
results for SRI portfolios. The introduction of short-selling restrictions resulted, as usual, in a
reduction of rejection cases, especially during the first two years.
23These results are relative to the tests performed on equally-weighted portfolios. For those performed on value-
weighted ones see appendix A
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Figure 4.17: Results of the efficiency test for the highest level of screening (Best 50%) based on the
four distinct scores (ESG,ENV,SOC,GOV) in the case of short-selling restrictions. Critical values are not
constant since the test statistic distribution is approximated via simulation.
From this analysis it seems that the four selection criteria, based on the different dimensions
of ESG performance, all have a very similar impact on efficiency. However, it is still possible
to identify at least two cases in which one strategy differed from the others:
1. The social score based strategy was the only one that, when allowing for short-selling,
yielded slightly different results; the efficiency hypothesis was never rejected during the
first two years of analysis (from June 2003 up to December 2005).
2. When imposing short-selling restrictions, the environment score based strategy almost
never had a significant impact during the period from late 2005 to late 2008.
Results for the two remaining degrees of screening, displaying similar levels of homogeneity
among the four strategies, are included in Appendix C (figures C.3 and C.4).
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4.4.2 Out-of-Sample Performance Comparison
Whether the four screening criteria had different impacts on realized portfolio performances
was verified employing the same methodology as in section 4.3.2. This consisted in testing the
difference in Sharpe ratio and variance between screened and not screened portfolios, for each
screening strategy.
The tests were performed for the period from June 2003 to March 2016 using monthly real-
ized returns of portfolios built following two different dynamic allocation strategies: one aimed
at maximizing the Sharpe ratio (for the Sharpe ratio test) and the other at minimizing returns
variance (for the variance test).
Results for the Sharpe ratio test, reported in tables 4.6 and 4.7, show that none of the screen-
ing strategies significantly underperformed nor outperformed the reference one. The variance
test, instead, yielded completely different results (table 4.8), with almost all screened portfolios
being significantly (at the 5% level) riskier than the non-screened one. More importantly, in
both tests, there are no evident differences between the four screening criteria.
Table 4.6: Results of the Sharpe ratio test performed on realized monthly returns relative to the entire
period (June 2003-March 2016).
Sharpe Ratio Test
Short-Selling No Short-Selling
Screening Level ∆ Sharpe ratio p-value ∆ Sharpe ratio p-value
Best 90% (ESG) 0.061 0.203 −0.026 0.553
Best 70% (ESG) 0.028 0.369 −0.043 0.403
Best 50% (ESG) 0.013 0.801 −0.066 0.403
Best 90% (ENV) 0.064 0.175 0.011 0.810
Best 70% (ENV) 0.023 0.706 −0.036 0.510
Best 50% (ENV) −0.015 0.536 −0.051 0.312
Best 90% (SOC) 0.051 0.171 −0.033 0.465
Best 70% (SOC) 0.004 0.792 −0.044 0.388
Best 50% (SOC) −0.030 0.322 −0.051 0.335
Best 90% (GOV) 0.060 0.238 −0.027 0.605
Best 70% (GOV) 0.065 0.357 −0.035 0.508
Best 50% (GOV) 0.097 0.164 −0.005 0.930
Notes: A negative value means that the screened portfolio outperformed the non-screened one.
*Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
**Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
***Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
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Table 4.7: Results of the Sharpe ratio test performed on realized monthly returns (portfolios built em-
ploying eq. returns) relative to the entire period (June 2003-March 2016).
Sharpe Ratio Test
Short-Selling No Short-Selling
Screening Level ∆ Sharpe ratio p-value ∆ Sharpe ratio p-value
Best 90% (ESG) −0.042 0.550 −0.012 0.642
Best 70% (ESG) −0.046 0.589 0.003 0.922
Best 50% (ESG) 0.024 0.790 0.016 0.675
Best 90% (ENV) −0.020 0.653 0.016 0.541
Best 70% (ENV) −0.060 0.485 −0.032 0.379
Best 50% (ENV) −0.008 0.935 −0.031 0.430
Best 90% (SOC) −0.050 0.497 −0.034 0.280
Best 70% (SOC) −0.058 0.483 0.012 0.730
Best 50% (SOC) −0.025 0.791 0.021 0.646
Best 90% (GOV) −0.051 0.434 −0.020 0.475
Best 70% (GOV) −0.022 0.815 0.013 0.731
Best 50% (GOV) 0.014 0.883 0.056 0.311
Notes: A negative value means that the screened portfolio outperformed the non-screened one.
*Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
**Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
***Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
Table 4.8: Results of the variance test performed on realized monthly returns relative to the entire period
(June 2003-March 2016).
Variance Test
Short-Selling No Short-Selling
Screening Level ∆ Log-variance p-value ∆ Log-variance p-value
Best 90% (ESG) −0.126*** 0.002 −0.187** 0.023
Best 70% (ESG) −0.181*** 0.001 −0.298*** 0.003
Best 50% (ESG) −0.217*** 0.001 −0.322*** 0.003
Best 90% (ENV) −0.095*** 0.009 −0.149* 0.057
Best 70% (ENV) −0.158*** 0.001 −0.263*** 0.015
Best 50% (ENV) −0.200*** 0.004 −0.339*** 0.005
Best 90% (SOC) −0.126*** 0.007 −0.198** 0.023
Best 70% (SOC) −0.177*** 0.007 −0.258** 0.011
Best 50% (SOC) −0.204*** 0.000 −0.291*** 0.007
Best 90% (GOV) −0.114** 0.017 −0.164* 0.051
Best 70% (GOV) −0.184*** 0.000 −0.267*** 0.007
Best 50% (GOV) −0.276*** 0.002 −0.400*** 0.008
Notes: A negative value means that the non-screened portfolio outperformed the screened one.
*Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
**Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level.
***Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
The main purpose of this master thesis was to verify whether the introduction, in the investment
process, of ethical and moral principles, commonly achieved through the implementation of one
or more of the SRI strategies seen in chapter 1, comes at a cost for investors. In particular, the
focus was on the effects that choosing not to invest in certain companies because of their (rel-
atively) bad ESG performance or involvement in controversial activities has on mean-variance
efficiency and portfolio performances.
As reported in Chapter 1, the SRI phenomenon is constantly gaining in popularity and, since
its beginning, whether SR investors have to sacrifice financial performance in order to pursuit
their social goals has been a highly debated topic.
In the last two decades, many studies, some of which are reviewed in chapter 2, managed
to shed some light on this matter, making use of different methodologies (Jensen’s alpha com-
parison, multi-factor analysis, spanning test, etc.) applied to a variety of datasets and forms of
investment.
Personally, I would divide these studies into two groups:
1. Those aimed at verifying whether stocks of socially responsible companies underperform
those of conventional ones.
2. Those aimed at investigating the effects, in terms of mean-variance opportunities, of the
exclusion of non-SR companies from the investment universe.
For the first group, findings were, with some exceptions, consistent with the “no effect”
hypothesis, stating that there are no significant differences between (risk-adjusted) expected
returns of socially responsible and conventional stocks. Regarding the second group, researchers
found that, when not imposing constraint to the mean-variance optimization problem, optimal
portfolios consisting exclusively of SR companies’ stocks perform significantly worse than their
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non-screened counterparts. Additional results showed that losses in terms of mean-variance
opportunities are mainly due to foregone risk reduction and not in terms of foregone returns.
Moreover, when imposing short-selling restrictions these losses tend to disappear.
This research, clearly belonging to the second group, introduced some novelties with re-
spect to previous comparable work, in particular those by Galema et al. (2009), and Herzel et al.
(2012). First, it focused on the European equity market, taking as reference index the STOXX
Europe 600 and using ESG ratings from Asset4. Second, the effects of excluding non-SR com-
panies were tested, using the efficiency test from Gibbons et al. (1989), on a quarterly rolling
basis starting from June 2003 and ending on March 2016. This allowed verifying whether these
effects are constant through time or vary depending on market conditions. Lastly, an important
part of the research was dedicated, employing the methodology from Ledoit and Wolf (2008,
2011), at comparing the realized performances of screened and non-screened portfolios.
5.1 Main Findings
The effects of the exclusion of non-SR companies, implemented via a combination of a nega-
tive screening and three levels of positive screening strategies, were first analysed in terms of
investment universe composition. Results showed that companies involved in “sin” activities,
excluded by the negative screening strategy, represented a significant and slightly growing frac-
tion of the rated ones, starting from 7% in 2003 up to around 11% in more recent years. The
screening process, even though adopting a Best-in-Universe approach, did not drastically af-
fect the investment universe in terms of industry composition. This means that, at least using
Asset4’s ratings, screened and non-screened investment universes does not differ in terms of
exposure to industry specific risks. The total market capitalisation analysis showed, instead,
that large companies, on average, tend to have higher ESG ratings than smaller ones, result pos-
sibly confirmed by the risk factor loadings comparison, where SR companies showed a smaller
exposure to the Small Minus Big factor.
The (ex-ante) efficiency tests, performed on a rolling basis, showed that the effects of ex-
cluding from the investment universe non-SR companies are not constant through time. For the
negative screening strategy, efficiency losses were almost never statistically significant, with
some exception at the beginning and at the end of the analysed time frame. For the remaining
screening strategies, the frequency of statistically significant losses increased with the level of
screening.
An interesting result was that, for all level of screening, the cases of efficiency of screened
portfolios were concentrated between September 2008 and June 2014. The tests performed dur-
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ing this time frame were based on returns relative to a period which included both the global
financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. This could mean that, during market
crisis, investing in non-SR companies does not offer significant additional mean-variance op-
portunities.
The introduction of short-selling restrictions, which, for many investors, represents a more
realistic scenario, drastically increased the number of cases of efficiency of screened portfolios,
for all screening level. This is consistent with the results obtained by Galema et al. (2009) and
Herzel et al. (2012).
Tests for differences in realized performance of screened and non-screened portfolios showed
that socially responsible investors, following a Sharpe ratio maximizing strategy, are not worse
off compared to their conventional counterparts, even at the highest levels of screening. Op-
posite results for investors following variance minimizing strategies, for which the exclusion
of non-SR companies determines significant losses in risk reduction opportunities. This was
noticeable especially during the period following the global financial crisis. In both cases, the
introduction of short-selling restrictions did not drastically affect the results.
Lastly, additional tests showed that socially responsible investors, following specific ESG
thematics (environment, social, governance), all sustain similar effects, both in terms of ex-
ante efficiency and realized portfolio performances, to those who adopt a less specific screening
criteria (average ESG score).
5.2 Recommendations for Future Research
During the carrying out of this master thesis I realized that both the research area and themethod-
ology are well suitable for future developments and improvements. What follows is a list of
suggestions which would contribute to further expand the research and obtain more robust re-
sults:
Different market regions: The first thing I have noticed, which, as already mentioned, lead
me to chose the European equity market as the object of this research, is that the majority
of the existing literature focuses on the North American region. It would be interesting,
data availability permitting, applying the same methodology to other, less investigated,
market regions, like, for example, Asia. The major problem to overcome would be the
lack of SRI data relative to Asian firms. As seen in Chapter 1, in this region, SRI strategies
are still scarcely adopted with SRI assets representing, in late 2014, less than 1% of the
total managed assets. Further research, relative to this market region, would probably also
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help increase the adoption rate (as long as the findings are positive for socially responsible
investors).
Different rating providers: What companies to exclude from the investment universe is, ul-
timately, determined by the methodology adopted by the ESG rating provider; different
methodologies may result in the exclusion of different companies. To test whether the im-
pact on portfolio performance, determined by application of the SRI strategies, is affected
by the rating methodology it would be sufficient to retrieve the ESG data from a differ-
ent provider, keeping everything else constant (investment universe, screening criteria,
testing methodology etc.).
Related to this matter is the fact that, with the methodology here adopted, it is not have
been possible to determine whether the effects of the SRI strategies application were
driven by the characteristics of the excluded companies (relatively low ESG ratings or
involvement in controversial activities) or merely by their number. This information
could be obtained through simulation, randomly assigning ESG ratings to the constituent
companies of the investment universe. Repeating this process multiple times and, again,
keeping constant everything else, it would be possible to compute a confidence interval
for the statistics of interest (ex-ante Sharpe ratio loss, market capitalization loss, etc.). If
the statistic relative to the original case falls in the confidence interval it would mean that
the result is mostly determined by the number of assets excluded and not by their char-
acteristics. Herzel et al. (2012) implemented a similar procedure defining it as “Random
screening”.
Investment universe size: The exclusion of non-SR assets may have different effects depend-
ing on the initial size of the investment universe. For this research, a relatively large
index, the STOXX Europe 600, was used as reference. Further research could be based
on even larger sized indices, such as the STOXX Europe Total Market (with over 1000
constituents), or smaller ones, maybe focusing on specific European countries or company
characteristics (capitalization, industry, etc.). This would also allow obtaining results use-
ful to socially responsible investors following more specific screening criteria.
Introduction of additional constraints: Short-selling restrictionwas the only type of constraint
taken into account in this research. While for the efficiency tests it is not possible to inves-
tigate the effects of the introduction of additional constraints (the methodology does not
allow it), it would be possible to apply the Sharpe ratio and variance tests to the realized
returns of portfolios built imposing, for example, size, group and turnover constraints. Un-
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fortunately, the computational resources required to solve the mean-variance optimization
process increase with the number of constraints and assets involved. With more than 500
assets, like in this case, the time required to perform all the necessary computation would
have represented a serious issue.
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Appendix A
Efficiency Test Using Value-Weighted
Portfolios
As described in Chapter 4, a major issue encountered when implementing the mean-variance
efficiency test was related to the number of assets included in the analysis; the test is only valid
when this is lower than the number of observations (T ). The adopted solution involved grouping
assets in 12 equally-weighted portfolios based on their rating status, as described in table 4.2.
As already mentioned in the chapter, the tests were also performed, as a robustness check, on
value-weighted portfolios, results of which are reported in this appendix. Unfortunately, since
it is not have been possible to retrieve market capitalization data prior to May 2001, the tests
were performed starting from June 2006.
Results of the efficiency tests for the usual four levels of screening are displayed in figure
A.1. It is visible that these results strongly resemble those obtained using equally-weighted port-
folios, with cases of acceptance of the null hypothesis concentrated in the period from late 2008
up to mid 2014. A minor difference regards the last year of analysis, which is not characterized
by the inefficiency of SRI portfolios as clearly as for the equally-weighted case. This is true
especially when introducing short-selling restrictions.
Figure A.2 displays the results of the efficiency tests, relative to the highest level of screen-
ing, aimed at verifying whether the three different dimensions of social responsibility had a
different impact on portfolio efficiency. In this case too, test results using value-weighted port-
folios are consistent with those obtained with equally-weighted ones.
Overall, the results displayed in this appendix confirm what already stated in chapter 4.
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(e) Negative screening (NSS)
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(g) Best 70% selection (NSS)
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Figure A.1: Results of the efficiency test for the four different levels of screening, with and without
short-selling restrictions. When the test value lies above the critical value the null hypothesis is rejected.
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(b) Best 50% selection (ENV)
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(d) Best 50% selection (GOV)
Jun
-03
De
c-0
3
Jun
-04
De
c-0
4
Jun
-05
De
c-0
5
Jun
-06
De
c-0
6
Jun
-07
De
c-0
7
Jun
-08
De
c-0
8
Jun
-09
De
c-0
9
Jun
-10
De
c-1
0
Jun
-11
De
c-1
1
Jun
-12
De
c-1
2
Jun
-13
De
c-1
3
Jun
-14
De
c-1
4
Jun
-15
De
c-1
5
Date
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Te
st
 S
ta
tis
tic
Value
C.V. 95%
(e) Best 50% selection (ESG,NSS)
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(f) Best 50% selection (ENV,NSS)
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(g) Best 50% selection (SOC,NSS)
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(h) Best 50% selection (GOV,NSS)
Figure A.2: Results of the efficiency test for the highest level of screening (Best 50%) based on the four
distinct scores (ESG,ENV,SOC,GOV), with and without short-selling restrictions. When the test value
lies above the critical value the null hypothesis is rejected.
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Appendix B
MATLAB Code
B.1 Mean-Variance Efficiency Test
1 function [xiGRS1,xiGRS2,p1,p2] = efficiency(R1,R2)
2 %
3 % This Matlab function performs the mean-variance efficiency test
4 % as proposed by Jobson(1982) and Gibbons, Ross & Shanken(1989).
5
6 % Input:
7 % RB: TxK matrix of excess returns of benchmark assets
8 % RN: TxN matrix of excess returns of test assets
9 %
10 % Output:
11 % xiGRS1: test statistic when assuming normally distributed returns
12 % xiGRS2: asynthotic test statistic
13 % p1: p-value for xiGRS1
14 % p2: p-value for xiGRS2
15 %
16
17 [T,K] = size(R1);
18 N = size(R2,2);
19
20 X = [ones(T,1) R1];
21
22
23 B = (X'*X)\(X'*R2);
24 e = (R2-X*B);
25 omega = (1/T)*((R2-X*B)'*(R2-X*B));
26 alpha = B(1,:)';
27 CovB = kron(inv(X'*X),omega);
28
29 mu0 = mean(R1)';
30 sigma0 = cov(R1,1);
31
32 % compute test statistics
33 xiGRS1 = ((T-(N+K))/N)*inv(1+mu0'*inv(sigma0)*mu0)...
34 *alpha'*inv(omega)*alpha;
35 xiGRS2 = T*inv(1+mu0'*inv(sigma0)*mu0)*alpha'*inv(omega)*alpha;
36
37 % compute p-values
38 p1 = 1-fcdf(xiGRS1,N,T-N-K);
39 p2 = 1-chi2cdf(xiGRS2,N);
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B.2 Mean-VarianceEfficiencyTestwith Short-SellingRestric-
tions
1 function [xiNSS,pval,percentiles] = efficiencyNSS(RB,RT,blocksize ,Nsim)
2 %
3 % This Matlab function performs the mean-variance efficiency test
4 % with restrictions to short sales. Since the test statistic has
5 % an unknown distribution , p-value and critical values are computed
6 % via simulation adopting the approach from Glen and
7 % Jorion(1993).
8 % Simulations are pefromed using the stationary bootsrap procedure from
9 % Politis and Romano(1994)
10 %
11 % Input:
12 % RB: TxK matrix of excess returns of benchmark assets
13 % RT: TxN matrix of excess returns of test assets
14 % Nsim: number of desired simulations (default = 1000)
15 % blocksize: desired block size for the block bootsrap (default = 1)
16 %
17 % Output:
18 % xiNSS: test statistic
19 % pval: p-value approximated via simulation
20 % percentiles: critical values (90%, 95%, 99%) approximated via
21 % simulation
22
23 %% Initialization %%
24
25 % set default values
26 if nargin <4;
27 Nsim = 1000;
28 if nargin <3;
29 blocksize = 1;
30 end;
31 end;
32
33 % set the options for the optimization function
34 options = optimoptions('fmincon','Algorithm','sqp','Display','none',...
35 'MaxIterations',10000,'MaxFunEvals',100000,'OptimalityTolerance',...
36 0.0000001,'FunctionTolerance',0.0000001,'StepTolerance',...
37 1.0e-7*0.00001);
38
39 %% Compute orginal test statistic %%
40
41 [T,K] = size(RB);
42 N = size(RT,2);
43
44 R = [RB RT];
45
46 % estimate MS portfolios using the Portfolio Object functions
47 p = Portfolio;
48 p = setAssetMoments(p,mean(R),cov(R));
49 p = setDefaultConstraints(p);
50 pwMS = estimateMaxSharpeRatio(p);
51 [psMS, prMS] = estimatePortMoments(p,pwMS);
52 Sh = prMS/psMS; %Maximum Sharpe ratio using test plus benchmark assets
53 rMS = R*pwMS;
54
55 p1 = Portfolio;
56 p1 = setAssetMoments(p1,mean(RB),cov(RB));
57 p1 = setDefaultConstraints(p1);
58 pwMSB = estimateMaxSharpeRatio(p1);
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59 [psMSB, prMSB] = estimatePortMoments(p1,pwMSB);
60 ShB = prMSB/psMSB; %Maximum Sharpe ratio using only benchmark assets
61 rMSB = RB*pwMSB;
62
63 % original test statistic
64 xiNSS = T*(Sh^2-ShB^2)/(1+ShB^2);
65
66 %% Compute simulated test statistics %%
67
68 % modify observed data in order to satisfy the null hypothesis
69 X = [ones(T,1) rMSB];
70 B = (X'*X)\(X'*RT);
71 alpha = B(1,:);
72 H0alpha = zeros(size(alpha));
73 H0B = [H0alpha;B(2:end,:)];
74 e = (RT-X*B);
75 H0RT = X*H0B+e;
76 H0R = [RB H0RT];
77
78 % set seed for the random number generator
79 rng('default');
80
81 % generate the Nsim sequences of bootstrapped indices
82 sequence = [];
83 for i = 1:Nsim;
84 [tempsequence] = sbSequence(T,blocksize);
85 sequence = [sequence tempsequence];
86 end;
87
88 % compute simulated test statistics
89 simxiNSS = zeros(Nsim,1);
90 parfor i = 1:Nsim;
91 % If the Parallel Computing Toolbox is installed , the parfor loop
92 % reduces computation time taking advantage of multi-core CPUs.
93 % Otherwise , it behaves as a regular for loop.
94
95 % bootstrap returns from modified data
96 simR = H0R(sequence(:,i),:);
97 simRB = simR(:,1:size(RB,2));
98 simmu = mean(simR)';
99 simSigma = cov(simR);
100
101 % function to minimize (negative of the Sharpe ratio)
102 f = @(w) (-(w*simmu)/sqrt(w*simSigma*w'));
103 % set constraints
104 lb = zeros(1,size(simR,2)); % lower bound
105 ub = ones(1,size(simR,2)); % upper bound
106 Amat = ones(1,size(simR,2)); % linear equality contraint
107 Bmat = 1;
108 simw0 = ones(1,size(simR,2))/size(simR,2); % initial point
109 % estimate the MS portfolio for all assets using fmincon
110 simpwMS = fmincon(f,simw0 ,[],[],Amat,Bmat,lb,ub,[],options);
111 simSh = (simpwMS*simmu)/sqrt(simpwMS*simSigma*simpwMS ');
112
113 simmu = mean(simRB)';
114 simSigma = cov(simRB);
115 f = @(w) (-(w*simmu)/sqrt(w*simSigma*w'));
116 lb = zeros(1,size(simRB ,2)); % lower bound
117 ub = ones(1,size(simRB ,2)); % upper bound
118 Amat = ones(1,size(simRB ,2)); % linear equality contraint
119 Bmat = 1;
120 simw0 = ones(1,size(simRB ,2))/size(simRB ,2); % initial point
121 % estimate the MS portfolio for benchmark assets using fmincon
122 simpwMSB = fmincon(f,simw0 ,[],[],Amat,Bmat,lb,ub,[],options);
123 simShB = (simpwMSB*simmu)/sqrt(simpwMSB*simSigma*simpwMSB ');
124
125 % compute simulated test statistic
90 APPENDIX B. MATLAB CODE
126 simxiNSS(i,1) = T*(simSh^2-simShB^2)/(1+simShB^2);
127 end;
128
129 %% Compute outputs %%
130
131 % compute p-value and critical values
132 pval = (sum(simxiNSS >=xiNSS)+1)/(Nsim+1);
133 percentiles = quantile(simxiNSS ,[0.90 0.95 0.99])';
Appendix C
Additional Tables and Figures
Table C.1: Industry composition for the different levels of screening (as of June 2003).
Industry Composition
Industry Reference Rated ”Sin” Excl. Best 90% Best 70% Best 50%
Financials 25.3% 22.6% 24.4% 21.9% 19.0% 17.1%
Industrial 19.8% 20.6% 19.7% 20.3% 21.0% 23.6%
Consumer Services 15.6% 15.9% 15.8% 16.3% 16.9% 16.4%
Consumer Goods 13.1% 13.6% 10.8% 10.8% 12.8% 10.0%
Basic Materials 6.7% 7.3% 7.9% 8.4% 8.7% 9.3%
Health Care 6.5% 6.0% 6.5% 6.0% 5.1% 6.4%
Utilities 4.0% 4.3% 4.7% 5.2% 5.6% 5.7%
Technology 3.4% 3.7% 3.9% 4.4% 2.6% 3.6%
Oil & Gas 2.8% 3.0% 3.2% 3.6% 4.1% 4.3%
Telecommunications 2.8% 3.0% 3.2% 3.2% 4.1% 3.6%
Table C.2: Industry composition for the different levels of screening (as of December 2009).
Industry Composition
Industry Reference Rated ”Sin” Excl. Best 90% Best 70% Best 50%
Financials 23.9% 23.5% 26.2% 22.0% 21.5% 21.8%
Industrial 19.9% 20.1% 18.6% 19.9% 20.3% 20.6%
Consumer Services 12.8% 12.9% 10.5% 11.4% 11.2% 10.7%
Consumer Goods 11.5% 11.5% 9.9% 10.1% 10.9% 10.3%
Basic Materials 7.3% 7.2% 8.0% 8.9% 9.4% 9.5%
Health Care 6.4% 6.5% 7.2% 7.3% 4.7% 4.5%
Utilities 4.7% 4.8% 5.4% 5.7% 7.1% 7.8%
Technology 4.4% 4.4% 4.7% 4.6% 4.1% 3.3%
Oil & Gas 5.8% 5.7% 6.4% 6.6% 6.8% 7.0%
Telecommunications 3.3% 3.3% 3.1% 3.4% 4.1% 4.5%
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Figure C.1: Number of companies per industry for the different levels of screening (as of June 2003).
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Figure C.2: Number of companies per industry for the different levels of screening (as of December
2009).
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(c) Best 90% selection (SOC)
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(d) Best 90% selection (GOV)
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(e) Best 90% selection (ESG,NSS)
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(f) Best 90% selection (ENV,NSS)
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(g) Best 90% selection (SOC,NSS)
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(h) Best 90% selection (GOV,NSS)
Figure C.3: Results of the efficiency test for the lowest level of screening (Best 90%) based on the four
distinct scores (ESG,ENV,SOC,GOV), with and without short-selling restrictions. When the test value
lies above the critical value the null hypothesis is rejected.
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(a) Best 70% selection (ESG)
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(b) Best 70% selection (ENV)
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(c) Best 70% selection (SOC)
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(d) Best 70% selection (GOV)
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(e) Best 70% selection (ESG,NSS)
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(f) Best 70% selection (ENV,NSS)
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(g) Best 70% selection (SOC,NSS)
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(h) Best 70% selection (GOV,NSS)
Figure C.4: Results of the efficiency test for the intermediate level of screening (Best 70%) based on
the four distinct scores (ESG,ENV,SOC,GOV), with and without short-selling restrictions. When the test
value lies above the critical value the null hypothesis is rejected.
